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BROKEN PLATFORMS, BROKEN COMMUNITIES? FREE 
SPEECH ON CAMPUS 
Stephen M. Feldman' 
ABSTRACT 
Free speech disputes have broken out on numerous college and university 
campuses. In several incidents, protesters have attempted to block the presentations 
of well-known and controversial speakers who threaten the communal status of 
societal outsiders. These events have sparked not only widespread media coverage 
but also the publication of multiple scholarly books and articles. None of this scholar-
ship, however, has recognized that the interrelated histories of free expression and 
democracy can shed considerable light on these matters. This Article takes on that 
challenge. Specifically, this Article explores the ramifications of the historical inter-
relationship between free expression and democracy for campus no-platforming 
disputes. Starting in the late 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically invigorated 
the protection of expression in reaction to a paradigm change in democracy, going 
from a republican to pluralist democracy. Yet, one cannot conceptoalize pluralist 
democracy without accounting for the political community: who belongs and parti-
cipates? Nowadays, to protect the operation of pluralist democracy itself, at least one 
issue must be taken off the table. All individuals must be treated as full and equal 
citizens in good standing. Any expression that undermines the political standing of 
a marginalized group should be subordinate to the needs of democracy and therefore 
beyond First Amendment protection. 
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Free speech on college and university campuses has generated controversies for 
decades.' In recent years, though, several such controversies have attracted widespread 
and sustained media attention. In one instance, progressive students attempted to pre-
vent conservative theorist Charles Murray, notorious for ostensibly linking intelligence 
to race,' from speaking at Middlebury College.' In a similar incident, progressive 
students at the University of California, Berkeley, interfered with a speech by former 
Breitbart editor and right-wing provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos.4 In response to these 
roiling disputes, publishers have rushed into print multiple new books focused on 
campus free speech issues.' 
The public has paid heed to these issues partly because of the polarizing politics 
that animate the disputes. 6 On the one side, conservatives emphasize liberty: right-
wing speakers have a First Amendment freedom to speak. 7 From this perspective, 
progressive protesters contravene fundamental norms of free expression. On the 
other side, progressives argue that campuses need to promote equality and inclusive-
ness. 8 Speakers such as Murray and Yiannopoulos purposefully denigrate racial and 
sexual minorities and transform campuses into hostile environments? Unsurprisingly, 
1 RIC!!ARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? WHY TilE FIRST 
AMENDMENT SHOUlD NOT PROTECT HATE SPEECH AND WHITE SUPREMACY 23-29 (2018) 
(emphasizingrecurringdisputes).ForadiscussionoftheFreeSpeechMovementof1964and 
1965 at the UniversityofCalifumia, Berkeley, see Jo Freeman, The Berkeley Free Speech Move-
ment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN SOCIALMOVEMENTS 1178 (Innnaoue!Nessed., 2004). 
2 For a discussion of that viewpoint, see RIC!!ARD J.IIERRNSTEIN & CHARLEs MURRAY, 
THE BElL CURVE: INTEUJGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). 
3 Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Muidlebwy, THE A1LAN1IC (Mar. 6, 
2017),https:/lwww.theatlaotic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/middlebmy-free-speech-violence 
/518667 [http://perma.cc/T6TA-S7AH]; Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by 
'Bell Curve' Author at Vermont College, N.Y. liMEs (Mar. 3, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2lo8Ye9. 
4 Aaron Hanlon, What Stunts Like Milo Yiannopoulos 's 'Free Speech Week' Cost, N.Y. 
TiMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yn9LxK; Benjamin Oreskes & Javier Paozar, Milo 
Yiannopoulos Co'lfronted by Dozens ofCounter-Protesters During Brief Appearance on UC 
Berkeley Campus, L.A TiMEs (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanowlla-me 
-ln-berkeley-milo-20 170924-story.html [http://perma.cc/HPV3-8KCV]. 
' For examples of such publications, see SrGALR BEN-PORATH,FREESPEECHONCAMPUS 
(2017); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (2017); 
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note I; JOHN PALFREY, SAFE SPACES, BRAVE SPACES: 
DIVERSITY AND FREE EXPRESSION IN EDUCATION (20 17); KEirn E. WHITI1NGTON, SPEAK 
FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE SPEECH (20 18). 
6 See Niraj Chokshi, What College Students Really Think About Free Speech, N.Y. TiMEs 
(Mar. 12, 20 18), https://nyti.ms/2tzsed9 (summarizing an empirical study of student attitudes 
toward free speech). 
7 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
8 See discussion irifi"a Section II.B. 
' For one discussion in the popular media, see Mark Peters, Coulter, Milo, and the Cen-
sorious History of 'No-Plaiforming,' BosTON GWBE (May 16, 2017), https://www.boston 
globe.com/ideas/20 17 /05/16/coulter-milo-and-censorious-history-platforming/V 5xoR6 
sUabA9at5yd8WhrK/story.html [http://permacc/BQP5-2L73]. 
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many constitutional scholars have adopted positions consistent with their general 
political orientations." Even so, the apparent tension between the constitutional values 
of free speech and equality has prompted some liberal scholars to support the con-
servative speakers as a matter of First Amendment principle." Other scholars insist 
that the tension between free speech and equality can be resolved without choosing 
between the two. 12 
Despite the proliferatioo of scholarship focused oo campus free speech issues, 
nobody has recognized that the interrelated histories of free expression and democ-
racy can shed considerable light on these matters." To be sure, some scholars have 
sought guidance from either the history of free expression or the cootours of democ-
racy, but they have not put the two together.14 This Article takes on that challenge. 
Specifically, this Article explores the ramifications of the historical interrelationship 
between free expression and democracy for campus no-platforming disputes, where 
student protesters try to prevent controversial right-wing speakers like Murray and 
Yiannopoulos from using campus facilities. 
One cannot understand free expression in America without accounting for a 
twentieth-century transition from a republican to pluralist democracy. Roughly, re-
publican democracy emphasized the virtuous pursuit of the common good, while 
pluralist democracy emphasized (and emphasizes) processes allowing widespread 
political participation." Judicial protection of free expression under republican 
10 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Essay, Defonding the First Amendment from Antidiscrimi-
nation Laws, 82 N.C. L. REv. 223 (2003) (arguing for the conservative side); Richard Delgado 
& Jean Stefancic, Four Ironies of Campus Climate, I 01 MINN. L. REv. 1919 (2017) (arguing for 
the progressive side). The politics of free expression has shifted over time. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 
BAUM, IDEOLOGY IN TilE SUPREME COURT 44-45 (20 17). 
11 CilEMERINsKY & GillMAN, supra note 5 (the liberal Cbernerinsky arguing for protecting 
free expression). 
12 BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at 2-5 (arguing that freedom and inclusion can be hanno-
nized in inclusive freedom); PALFREY, supra note 5, at2-3 (arguing for hannonizationoffree 
expression and equality); Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, I 01 MINN. L. 
REv. 1863 (2017) (aiming for a middle ground). 
13 For a comprehensive history of the interrelationship between democracy and free ex-
pression, see STEPHEN M. FElDMAN, FREE ExPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY (2008). 
14 See, e.g., CilEMERINsKY &GillMAN, supra note 5, at 10-12,47 (arguingthatthehistory 
of free expression is important to analyzing current campus free speech disputes); Delgado 
& Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1924-32 (discussing the history of free expression). 
15 For books discussing aspects of the transformation of democracy, see LlzABElH CoHEN, 
MAKING A NEW DEAl: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CIDCAGO, 1919-1939 (1990); FELDMAN, 
supra note 13; HOWARDGill.MAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: TIIERISEANDDEMISEOF 
LoCHNERERAPOUCEPOWERSJURISPRUDENCE(1993);M!CHAELJ.SANDEL,DEMOCRACY'S 
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PuBUC PHILoSOPHY (1996). Bruce Ackerman also 
emphasizes regime change in constitutional law. His discussions of the key decade of the 1930s 
are spread over two volumes. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE TilE PEoPlE: THE Crv!LRIGHTS REvo-
LUTION (20 14 ); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE TilE PEOPlE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
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democracy was limited, 16 but free expression became a constitutional lodestar under 
pluralist democracy." Wbile theorists of pluralist democracy often emphasize its crucial 
processes, such as voting, 18 pluralist democracy necessarily includes substantive com-
ponents as well. 19 Most important, one cannot conceptualize pluralist democracy 
without accounting for the political community: who belongs and participates? My 
argument is tbat, today, to protect the operation of pluralist democracy itself, we 
must take at least one issue off the table, so to speak. Namely, all individuals, re-
gardless of subculture or societal grouping, must be treated as full and equal citizens 
in good standing. This issue can no longer be open to democratic debate. Conse-
quently, any expression that undermines the political standing of a marginalized group 
should be subordinate to the needs of democracy and therefore beyond First Amend-
ment protection. 
With regard to the no-platforming disputes, this analysis suggests tbat universities 
and colleges should restrict the granting of platforms to speakers who are likely to 
threaten the full and equal standing of marginalized groups on campuses. If a plat-
form is denied in the frrst place, then students will not need to protest against such 
speakers. The university or college should not pretend to maintain neutrality. It 
instead needs to nurture and protect the substantive norms of a democratic culture. 
Part I of this Article traces the interrelated histories of free expression and 
democracy.20 It emphasizes the twentietb-centurytransformation of democracy and the 
First Amendment implications of tbat transformation. 21 Part II focuses on no-
platforming disputes, zeroing in on a recent controversy at Lewis and Clark Law 
School. 22 This Part first explains the arguments in favor of upholding the free speech 
rights of the speakers. 23 It then articulates a counterargument based on the interrela-
tion of free expression and democracy.24 Part ill returns to history, briefly sketching 
the operation of politics in free speech disputes throughout American history.25 Free 
expression, the history shows, bas not been a neutral principle. In free speech con-
troversies (as in otber disputes), marginalized outsiders typically lose while the wealthy 
and mainstream usually win. This history helps explain why abstract or formal free-
expression principles and doctrines cannot alone resolve the no-platforming dis-
putes. Part N is a conclusion.'6 
16 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 3. 
17 Id. 
18 See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 203-tl8 and accompanying text. 
20 See discussion irifi"a Part I. 
21 See discussion infra Sections I.A, B. 
22 See discussion infra Part II. 
23 See discussion irifi"a Section II.A. 
24 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
25 See discussion infra Part ill. 
26 See discussion irifi"a Part IV. 
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A caveat is appropriate at the outset. This Article does not argue that the United 
States has always been committed to a principle of full and equal citizenship. The 
nation, moreover, has not made steady progress toward achieving such equality. To 
the contrary, a conflicting combination of principles and traditions has always swirled 
through America. In his magisterial study of citizenship laws, Rogers M. Smith 
described a shifting mix of"liberal, democratic republican, and inegalitarian ascrip-
tive elements. 'm In the history of free expression, competing traditions of dissent 
and suppression persistently animated American political disputes. 28 Furthermore, 
the tensions arising from conflicting principles and traditions remain as prominent 
today as ever. Thus, in a sense, the argument here is aspirational. A commitment to 
full and equal citizenship will not vanqnish the inegalitarian ascriptive attitudes that 
still pulse through American society. In the no-platforming disputes, the issues 
revolve around the treatment of students and potential or invited speakers. Even if 
a university or college were to banish speakers likely to spout hateful words, hateful 
attitudes will not disappear. But banning speakers who target marginalized groups 
will help engender democratic communities of full and equal citizens. 
I. 1iiE INTERRELATED HiSTORIES OF FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY 
A. Republican Democracy: Limited Protection for Expression 
From the framing to the early twentieth century, Americans understood their 
government to be a republican democracy. 29 Citizens and government officials were 
supposed to be imbued with civic virtue. 30 Being virtuous, they were to pursue the 
common good rather than partial or private interests; the political pursuit of self-
interest contravened republican democratic government." To be sure, popular 
conceptions of virtue and the common good changed over time. 32 For instance, the 
framers considered political parties to be factions bent on government corruption. 33 
Parties, therefore, were believed to inherently contravene the common good, but by 
27 ROOERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CmzENSHIP IN U.S. HIS-
TORY 6 (1997). 
28 FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 3-5. 
29 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 14-290; STEPHEN M. FElDMAN, THE NEW ROBERTS 
COURT, DONAlD TRUMP, AND OUR FAlliNG CONS1ITUTION 19-104 (2017) [hereinafter 
FEIDMAN,FAillNGCONSTITUIION]; SANDEL,szpranote 15, at 124--67.See also SMITH, supra 
note 27, at 1-<i, 86-88, 470-71 (emphasizingthatAmericacombines democratic republican, 
liberal, and inegalitarian ascriptive traditions). 
3° FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 22. 
31 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF TilE AMERICAN REPUBUC, 1776-1787, at 59 
(1969). 
32 FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 32-40. 
33 STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKriRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERAUSM 596-{;17 (1993). 
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the 1830s many Americans accepted political parties.34 Supposedly, parties furthered 
the common good by promoting more widespread political participation. 35 
Even so, political participation remained sharply limited under republican democ-
racy. An alleged lack of civic virtue could, in theory, legitimate the forced political 
exclusion of a societal group. Non-virtuous people supposedly would be unwilling 
to forgo the pursuit of their own private interests." Partly on this pretext, African 
Americans, Irish-Catholic immigrants, women, and other peripheral groups were pre-
cluded from participating in republican democracy for much of American history.37 
To take one instance, when large numbers of Catholic immigrants began coming to 
the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, Protestant nativists condemned the 
immigrants as unqualified for citizenship. 38 "'Protestantism favors Republicanism,"' 
declared Samuel Morse, ''whereas 'Popery' supports 'Monarchical power. "'39 Unsur-
prisingly, then, conceptions of virtue and the common good typically mirrored the 
interests and values of wealthy, white, Protestant men.40 
Under republican democracy, individual rights and liberties were protected from 
undue government interference but were always subordinate to the government's 
power to act for the common good. In the words of James Kent, ''private interest 
must be made subservient to the general interest of the community.'"'' These princi-
ples, to a great degree, structured republican democratic judicial review. Courts would 
review government actions to determine whether a disputed action was for the com-
mon good-and therefore permissible--or for partial and private interests-and 
therefore impermissible.42 In an 1845 case, a Boston entrepreneur sought to sell 
34 EDWARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA 197 (rev. ed. 1985). 
35 ld. at 197-232; IIARRYL. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: T!IEPOUIICSOF JACKSONIAN 
AMERICA 172-74 (1990). In fact, voter turnout soared during the middle decades of the nin<>-
teenth century. ERIK W. AUSTIN, POUIICAL FACTS OF TilE UNTIED STATES SINCE 1789, at 
3 78-79 (1986). 
" On exclusion of societal groups from the polity, see ALExANDERKEYSSAR, THERmm 
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HisTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN TilE UNTIED STATES 54-60 (2000); 
SMITH, supra note 27, at 170-73. 
37 SANDEL, supra note 15, at318; SMITH, supra note 27, at 85. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, 
STRANGERSINTIIELAND:PATTERNSOFAMERICANNATIVISM, 1860-1925,at6(2ded.l988) 
(discussing the condemnation of Catholic immigrants). 
38 HIGHAM, supra note 3 7, at 6. 
39 SMITH, supra note 27, at 209. 
4° For example, during the late nineteenth century, as the nation industrialized, large cor-
porations sought restrictions on governmeut regulation by arguing that the common good was 
commensurate with laissez faire. See, e.g., Millettv. People, 7N.E. 631,635-36 (1886) (invali-
dating a law preventing coal companies from cheating their miners when weighing the quantity 
mined); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON TilE LiMITATIONS OF POUCE POWER IN 
TilE UNITED STATES 4-5 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1886) (recognizing the power of governments 
to act for the common good but arguing that such exercises of power were rare). 
41 2JAMESKENT, COMMENrARIESONAMERICANLAW276 (1827). 
42 FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 26-32; GillMAN, supra note 15, at 51-55; WllllAMJ. 
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poultry he had acquired in New Hampshire, but in doing so, he violated a municipal 
regulation of the marketplace.43 The city required a seller to show "that all the said 
articles are the produce of his own farm, or of some farm not more than three miles 
distant from his own dwelling-house.'""' The seller objected, contending that "the 
by-law is contrary to common right, in restraint of trade, against public policy, 
unreasonable and void.'"'' In an opinion by Lemuel Shaw, the court upheld the 
regulation, reasoning that the city had provided "accommodations" for sales by 
"actual producers.",. Consequently, the city had "a right so to control them, as best 
to promote the welfare of all the citizens. And we think they are well calculated to 
promote the public and general benefit," notwithstanding the restrictions on the 
economic marketplace. 47 
Courts treated free-expression rights similarly to other individual rights. Follow-
ing the general republican democratic approach to judicial review, the predominant 
doctrinal framework for analyzing free-expression claims was the bad tendency test. 48 
While "the government could not impose prior restraints ... it could impose criminal 
penalties for speech or writing that had bad tendencies or likely harmful conse-
quences.'"'' According to Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, 
the government could punish speakers and writers for "what is improper, mischievous, 
or illegal. "50 In other words, courts upheld government actions punishing expression 
likely to produce bad tendencies precisely because such speech or writing under-
mined virtue and contravened the common good. 51 
The Supreme Court of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gave no 
greater protection to free expression than did other courts. In fact, the Court often 
skirted free-expression issues, 52 and when the Justices acknowledged such an issue, 
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE 19-234 (1996). See, e.g., State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 
(2 Yer.) 599 (1831); Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825). 
43 Commonwealth v. Rice, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 253-54,256,259 (1845). 
44 Id. at 256. 
45 Id. at 258. 
46 Id. at 258-59. 
47 Id. 
48 FElDMAN, FAn.ING CONS1TIUTION, supra note 29, at 61. 
49 !d. The bad tendency test developed from the truth-conditional standard tbat first emerged 
in seditious libel cases. FElDMAN, supra note 13, at II 0-18; Genevieve Lakier, The Invention 
of Low-Value Speech, 128 HAR.v. L. REv. 2166,2184--86 (2015) (referring to this standard as 
the "truth-plus defense''). 
50 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TilE CONS1TIUTION OF TilE UNITED STATES 736 
(1833). 
51 SeeKnowlesv. United States, 170F. 409(8thCir.l909);Updegraphv. Commonwealth, 
11 Serg. &Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824); Commonwealthv. Morris, 3 Va. (IVa. Cas.) 176(1811). 
52 Mut. Fihn Corp. v. Ohio Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244-45 (1915)(rejectingaclaim 
that a licensing requirement amounted to a prior restraint, the Court reasoned "that the exhibi-
tion of moving pictores is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit''). 
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they tended to treat it as an aspect of due-process liberty. 53 In Halter v. Nebraska, 54 
decided in 1907, the Court upheld the conviction under a state flag-desecration 
statute of defendants who used the American flag on beer bottles." Justice John 
Marshall Harlan's majority opinion discussed free expression at length, but as an 
aspect of due-process liberty rather than as a First Amendment right per se." He 
began by explicating the powers of a republican democratic government: "[A] 
[s]tate possesses all legislative power consistent with a republican form of govern-
ment; therefore each [ s ]tate ... may, by legislation, provide not only for the health, 
morals and safety of its people, but for the common good, as involved in the well-
being, peace, happiness and prosperity of the people."57 Thus, as Harlan explained, 
"[i]t is familiar law that even the privileges of citizenship and the rights inhering in 
personal liberty are subject, in their enjoyment, to such reasonable restraints as may 
be required for the general good."" More specifically, then, free expression, as an as-
pect of personal liberty, was subordinate to any state actions promoting the common 
good. 59 In this particular case, the protection of the flag from desecration, including 
its use "for purposes of trade and traffic," would further the common good.60 A state 
would "be wanting in care for the well-being of its people if it ignores the fact that 
they regard the flag as a symbol of their country's power and prestige, and will be 
impatient if any open disrespect is shown towards it.,,., 
The Court did not explicitly address free expression under the First Amendment 
until the World War I era. In a series of cases arising from Espionage Act prosecu-
tions, Justice Oliver Wendell Hohnes, Jr., articulated the scope of protection under 
the First Amendment with a multitude of phrasings. 62 Regardless ofHohnes' s termi-
nology, he resolved each case in accordance with the bad tendency test. 63 In Schenck 
v. United States,64 two leaders of the Socialist party were convicted for distributing 
a leaflet that had opposed the war-time draft. 65 The defendants argued that the First 
Amendment protected their expression. 66 A unanimous Court upheld the convic-
tions. 67 With regard to the scope of free expression, Hohnes stated: "The question 
53 See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. 
54 205 u.s. 34 (1907). 
" Id. at 46. 
56 See id. at 40-43. 
51 Id. at 40-41. 
58 Id. at 42. 
59 See id. at 40-42. 
60 Id. at 42. 
61 Id. 
62 See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text. 
63 See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text. 
64 249 u.s. 47 (1919). 
65 Id. at 48-49. 
66 Id. at 51. 
61 Id. at 53. 
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in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.,,., Holmes's 'clear and present 
danger' tenninology was novel, yet his application of the test demonstrated that he 
did not intend to pronounce a new standard for delineating the scope of free expres-
sion.69 For Holmes (and the Court), clear and present danger meant bad tendency. 
In the subsequent Espionage Act cases, Frohwerk v. United States10 and Debs 
v. United States, 71 Holmes continued to follow bad-tendency principles, though he 
disregarded his 'clear and present danger' tenninology.72 For instance, Holmes's 
opinion in Debs approved a jury instruction that presented the bad tendency test in 
conventional terms--the jurors, as charged, "could not find the defendant guilty for 
advocacy of any ofhis opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency 
and reasonably probable effect [to violate the law], and unless the defendant had the 
specific intent to do so in his mind. "73 This frrst set of World War I cases revealed 
that all of the Justices believed the government could punish expression impeding 
the national war effort because such expression was harmful or had bad tendencies, 
in contravention of the common good. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Court would continue to apply the bad-tendency 
standard to fmd speech and writing constitutionally unprotected. 74 But in the next 
set of Espionage Act cases, decided only months after Debs, Holmes (along with 
Justice Louis Brandeis) began dissenting and arguing for more expansive First 
Amendment protections. 75 Although Holmes would never admit as much, the argu-
ments of a young Harvard professor, Zechariah Chafee, probably shaped Holmes's new 
68 !d. at 52. 
69 Holmes apparently derived the 'clear and present danger' language from his book, The 
Common Law. OUVER WENDEI.LHOI.MES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 66--68 (Little, Brown & 
Company ed. 1945) (1881). See G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of 
Free Speech .Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAUF.L.REv. 391, 414--19 (1992) (dis-
cussing Holmes's understanding of criminal attempts and how it shaped his clear and present 
danger test). But see David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine, SOU. Cin.L.REv.1205, 1271-78 (1983)(arguingthatthis connection was probable but 
not definite). 
70 249 u.s. 204 (1919). 
71 249 u.s. 211 (1919). 
72 Id.; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. 204. 
73 Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. 
74 See generally United States ex rei. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub!' g Co. v. Burleson, 
255 U.S. 407 (1921) (holding that the removal of second-class mailing privileges pursuant 
to the Espionage Act did not infringe on a publications rigbt of free speech); Schaefer v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (upholding the convictions ofthreenewspaperpublishers 
for wilfully making statements that migbt weaken the United States' war effort). 
75 Burleson,255U.S. at417-38 (Brandeis, J. &Holmes, I., dissenting); Schaefor,251 U.S. 
at 482-95 (Brandeis, J. & Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
624--31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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approach to free expression.76 Chafee had published an article arguing for stronger 
constitutional protections based on Holmes's own 'clear and present danger' termi-
nology. 77 Chafee justified a more expansive First Amendment, going beyond bad 
tendency principles by invoking a search-for-truth rationale. 78 Jolm Milton had first 
articulated this rationale in 1644 (during the English Civil War),79 and Jolm Stuart 
Mill had reiterated it in 1859.8° Foil owing in their path, Chafee linked an individual 
speaker's right to (or interest in) free expression with a societal interest in the search 
for truth: "The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most 
important purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread of truth 
on subjects of general concern. This is possible ouly through absolutely unlimited 
discussion .... "81 
In Abrams v. United States,82 decided in 1919, the Court once again upheld 
convictions under the Espionage Act. 83 Holmes, joined by Brandeis, dissented, 
reasoning that the defendants' expression should be constitutionally protected. 84 
Like Chafee, Holmes relied on the clear and present danger test, but now with more 
bite than the bad tendency standard. 85 Also, like Chafee, Holmes justified First 
Amendment protections based on a societal search for truth: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the ouly ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried out. 86 
76 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 272-81 (explaining Holmes's changed attitude toward 
free expression). 
77 See Zechariah Chafee, Freedom ofSpeech in War Time, 32 HARv. L.REv. 932 (1919) 
[hereinafter Chafee, War Time]. Chafee based this article on an earlier essay. Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., Freedom of Speech, 17 NEW REPu!luc 66 (1918). 
78 Chafee, War Time, supra note 77, at 956--60. 
79 Jolm Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the 
Parliament of England (Grolier Club 1890) (1644). 
80 JOHN STUART MILL, ONLIBERT¥21-27 (Currin Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956) 
(1859). Chafee cited both Milton and Mill. Chafee, War Time, supra note 77, at 932-33 n.l, 
954-55. 
81 Chafee, War Time, supra note 77, at 956. 
82 250 u.s. 616 (1919). 
83 !d. 
84 See id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I cannot put into more impressive words 
my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their 
rights under the Constitution .... ''). 
" !d. at 627-28. 
86 Id. at 630. 
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Holmes linked the clear and present danger test with the search-for-truth rationale. 87 
The government, he explained, should allow speech and writing to flow into a market-
place ofideas. 88 From this free exchange of ideas, the truth will emerge." Harmful 
ideas must be met with better ideas--counter-speech-rather than with force or sup-
pression. 90 The ouly ideas (speech and writing) that should be restricted are those 
that would inhibit the further exchange ofideas-namely, those that would engender 
a clear and present (or imminent) danger of unlawful or harmful conduct." 
B. Pluralist Democracy: Expansive First Amendment Protection 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, multiple societal forces 
strained the republican democratic regime of government.92 Because of immigration, 
the population grew increasingly diverse." The agrarian economy transformed with 
industrialization and people left their rural homes to live in the "burgeoning cities.,,.,. 
"[O]ld-stock Americans" fought these changes in different ways. 95 For instance, in 
the 1920s, the government placed severe quotas on the immigration of eastern and 
southern Europeans, deemed to be "racially inferior to Anglo-Saxon[ s ]. "96 Likewise, 
surging nativism helped engender Prohibition as a religious and cultural strike against 
Catholics." States introduced new laws limiting suffrage, supposedly to weed out 
corruption and create "a more competent electorate,"" yet these laws typically pre-
vented immigrants and the poor from voting. 99 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 Holmes did not use the precise phrase, ''marketPlace of ideas." See VincentBlas~ Holmes 
and the Marketplace of ideas, 2004 SUP. Cr.REv.1, 24n.80 (noting the first use of this phrase 
was in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 
(1965), decided more than forty years after Holmes's Abrams dissent). 
92 FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 166. 
" See id. at 170-71. 
94 See id. at 166-78 (discussing in greater detail the development and effects of indus-
trialization, urbanization, and innnigration). 
" Id. at 171. 
96 /d. SeeU.S.lMMIGRATIONCOMM'N,DICTIONARYOFRACESORPEOPLES,S.DOC.N0.662 
(3d Sess. 1911) (describing racial differences of various innnigrant groups); E. P. HUTCHINSON, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POUCY, 1798-1965, at 187-92 (1981 ). 
97 JOSEPH R. GUSFIE!D, SYMBOUC CRUSADE: STATUS POUTICS AND THE AMERICAN 
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 122-23 (1963). 
98 KEYSSAR, supra note 36, at 128. 
" See id. at 128-29 (describing measures that prevented voting); ARTHURS. LINK & 
RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 53-55 (1983) (emphasizing reduced voting in poor 
and innnigrant communities). 
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Despite the reactionary backlash from old-stock Americans, republican democ-
racy was failing by the late 1920s.""' The onset of the Great Depression precipitated 
its demise. 101 The nineteenth-century agrarian, rural, and relatively homogeneous 
American society was no more. 102 During the 1930s, massive numbers of immi-
grants and their children became part of the American polity; ethnic and immigrant 
urbanites who had previously been discouraged from partaking in national politics 103 
became voters, casting their support for the New Deal.104 As a practical matter, 
mainstream and old-stock Protestant values, long the foundation for the republican 
democratic ideals of virtue and the common good, were now to be balanced with the 
values of other Americans who constituted the demographically diverse popula-
tion.105 No single set of cultural values was authoritative.106 Ethical relativism took 
hold as a political reality: all values, all interests--or at least a plurality of values 
and interests-mattered to Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers. 107 Democracy 
now revolved around the assertion of interests and values by sundry individuals and 
groups. 108 The pursuit of self-interest no longer amounted to corruption; rather it 
defined the nature of (pluralist) democracy.'" Thus, for example, legislation favor-
ing labor unions was no longer condemned as pursuing only partial or private 
interests, as it had been under republican democracy.110 Labor and management now 
seemed to stand on the same footing--they both constituted legitimate interest groups, 
as did all other politically motivated groups.111 Diverse voluntary organizations and 
interest groups openly sought to press their claims through the democratic process.112 
10° FElDMAN, supra note 13,at314. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. at 166--97. 
103 See KEYSSAR, supra note 36, at 128-29. 
104 See AN'IHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933-40, at 248-49 
(1989); COHEN, supra note 15, at254--57, 362-{;6; WIIllAME.LEuCHTENBURG,FRANKr.iN 
D. ROOSEVELT ANDTHENEWDEAL 1932-1940, at 184 (1963). 
10
' See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 316. 
106 See id. at 316-17,341. 
107 See id. at316-17; see also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive 
Government at the CommonwealthClub(Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 THEPUllUCPAPERSANDAJ>. 
DRESSESOFFRANKLIND.ROOSEVELT742, 742-56 (1938). Roosevelt was far more solicitous 
of African American interests than any previous president, yet be often sacrificed black interests 
and values so as to keep white Southerners aligned with the Democratic party. FElDMAN, supra 
note 13, at 327-28. Also, Roosevelt eventually bmke with and became antagonistic toward 
big business. See id. at 318-19,324. 
108 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 316. 
109 See id. at 321. 
110 See id. at 320-21. 
111 See id. at 320. See also JEROlD S. AUERBACH, LABORANDLIBERTY: THE LAFOLLETTE 
COMMITIEEAND THENEWDEAL27-53 (1966); MELVYNDuBOFSKY, THE STATE&LABOR 
IN MODERN AMERICA 107-34 (1994). 
112 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 341. 
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Lobbying-illegal during the republican democmtic era-"became open, aggres-
sive, and institutionalized."113 
By the end of the 193 Os, political theorists had begun to elabomte the new form 
of democmcy. The foundation for the incipient democratic theory was the scholarly 
embrace of relativism.114 While totalitarian governments, such as those in Nazi Ger-
many and Stalinist Russia, claimed knowledge of objective values and forcefully 
imposed those values and concomitant goals on their peoples, 115 democmtic govern-
ments allowed their citizens to express multiple values and goals. 116 The key to democ-
racy lay not in the specification of supposedly objective goals, such as the common 
good, but rather in the following of processes that allowed all citizens to voice their 
respective values and interests within a free and open democmtic arena. 117 After World 
War II, numerous political theorists celebrated pluralist democracy. The only way to 
determine public values and goals, they explained, is "through the free competition of 
interest groups."118 By "composing or compromising'' their different values and inter-
ests, 119 the "competing groups [would] coordinate their aims in programs they can 
all support."120 Legislative decisions therefore turned on negotiation, persuasion, and 
the exertion of pressure through the normal channels of the democratic process.121 
From this perspective, the government appears to provide a neutral framework of 
processes or procedures that allows individuals and interest groups to assert their 
respective values and interests.122 
For much of the 1930s, conservative Supreme Court Justices resisted the tran-
sition to pluralist democracy and attempted to continue enforcing republican 
113 !d. at 322-23. 
114 See id. at 330. 
ns Id. at 331. 
116 7 JOHN DEWEY, E11l!CS(l932), reprinted in THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 359 
(JoAnn Boydston ed., 1985). 
117 SANDEL, supra note 15, at 250 (discussing the transition to procedural republic or 
democracy). 
118 WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALcOlM C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN Pouncs: 
THE NATIONAL GoVERNMENT 9 (1949). 
119 !d. 
120 !d. at 8. 
121 FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 332. Robert Dahl developed the most comprehensive 
explanation of the democratic process. See ROBERT A DABL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC 
THEoRY (1956) [hereinafter DABL, DEMOCRATIC THEoRY]; ROBERT A DABL, A PREFACE TO 
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985) [hereinafter DABL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A. 
DABL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs (1989) [hereinafter DABL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs]; 
ROBERT A. DABL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS TilE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (200 I) [hereinafter 
DABL, HOW DEMOCRATIC]. 
122 See FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 396; JOHN RAWLS, POUTICAL LmERAUSM (1993) 
(articulating the philosophy of political hberalism); SANDEL, supra note 15, at3-24, 28,250--73 
(explaining the procedural republic). 
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democratic principles.'" By the end of the decade, however-193 7 was a turning 
point-the Court had accepted the transition and stopped emphasizing virtue and the 
common good.124 But the Court's abandonment of republican democracy created a 
problem: if judicial review had largely revolved around the republican democratic prin-
ciples of virtue and the common good, how should the Court structure judicial review 
under pluralist democracy? The Justices experimented with different approaches.125 
During this time period, for instance, the Court first began using balancing tests to 
resolve constitutional issues. 126 In congressional power cases, though, the Court 
emphasized deference to the democratic process. 127 Significantly, before the 1930s, 
the Justices rarely even mentioned democracy, but after the 193 7 turn, they regularly 
discussed democratic participation. 128 
In the realm of free expression, the rejection of republican democratic judicial 
review led the Justices to abandon the bad tendency test. 129 The Court and numerous 
commentators recognized that the emergent pluralist democracy depended on free 
speech more fundamentally than had republican democracy. 130 At least as far back as 
the framing, commentators had linked free expression-most often, a free press-
ith free government. 131 This link was always conceived from within the parameters 
of republican democracy; 132 hence, the emphasis on free rather than self government. 
Most commonly, Republican democratic theorists would emphasize that free ex-
pression helped check the potential for government officials to become corrupt and 
123 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal 
ConservationActofl935); R.R. Ret Bd v. AltonR.R. Co.,295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating 
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935). 
124 SeeNLRBv. Jones&LaughlinSteelCorp.,301 U.S. I (1937)(upholdingtheNational 
Labor RelationsActofl935); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)(upholding 
a state minimwn wage statute); FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 349-59 (discussing the 1937 
switch); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 
429-43 (2010). 
m See SANDEL, supra note 15, at47-54 (discussing the Court's efforts to reconceptualize 
judicial review). 
126 See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 
96 YAIEL.J. 943 (1987). 
127 See, e.g., Wickardv. Filburn, 317U.S.lll (1942)(upholdingproductionquotasofthe 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193 8). 
128 MortonJ. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution ofChange: Legal Fundamentality With-
out Fundamentalism, 1 071fARv. L. REv. 30, 56-57 (1993) (discussing the emerging importsnce 
of democracy). See JOHN H. ELY,DEMOCRACY AND Dis1RUST(l980) {emphasizing connections 
between pluralist democracy and judicial review). 
129 The first case in which the Court arguably upheld a free speech claim was decided in 1931. 
Strombergv. California, 283 U.S. 359(1931). FElDMAN, supra note 13, at388-89 (discussing 
whether the Court based its decision on First Amendment grounds). 
130 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 391-92. 
131 Id. at 56, 63. 
132 Id. at 391. 
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contravene the common good.133 The press, in particular, acted like a watchdog, 
sniffing out the unvirtuous.134 
But with the onset of pluralist democracy, free expression appeared to perform a 
different and more crucial role. Soon after the Court began to defer to the democratic 
process in congressional power cases, Justice Stone's famous footnote four in Carolene 
Products questioned whether such deference was appropriate when legislation either 
infringed liberties protected by the Bill ofRights, including free expression, restricted 
participation in democratic processes, or discriminated "against discrete and insular mi-
norities. "135 As the Justices and commentators recognized, free expression had become 
integral to the (pluralist) democratic process itself.136 The people must be able to openly 
express their values and interests in the political arena.137 Without free expression, 
pluralist democracy could not exist.138 Thus, the so-called self-governance rationale 
was born. 139 
Pursuant to the self-governance rationale, free expression allows diverse groups 
and individuals to contribute their views in the pluralist political arena.140 "If gov-
ermnental officials interfere[] with the pluralist ... process," if they dictate or control 
"public debates, then they ... skew the democratic outcomes and undermine the 
consent of the governed."141 In his 1948 book, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government, Alexander Meiklejohn emphasized that the need to protect political 
expression "springs from the necessities of the program ofself-govermnent,"142 or in 
other words, from "the structure and functioning of our political system as a whole. "143 
Thus, partly because of the self-governance rationale, free expression became a 
133 !d. at 396. 
134 See id. at 57--{i3. Some republican democratic theorists would add that free expression 
eocouraged virtuous citizeos to promote the common good. Id at 396. Wbeo Justice Brandeis 
explained free expression in his Whitney concurreoce, he discussed the relation between free 
expression and governmeot from this republican democratic perspective. Whitneyv. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also FElDMAN, supra note 13, 
at 385-86 (explaining Brandeis's viewpoint). 
135 United States v. Caro1eoe Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
136 FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 396. 
137 See id. 
138 !d. See W. Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943); DAHL, 
DEMOCRACY ANDITSCRmcs,supranote 121, at 169--75; HanyKalven, Jr., The New York 
Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, " 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 
191, 208 (emphasizing the importance of free expression). 
139 FrederickScbauer,FreeSpeechandtheArgumentfromDemocracy,inLIBERALDEMOC-
RACY: NOMOS XXV, at 241, 245-47 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983). 
140 SeeFEI.DMAN,supranote 13, at316. 
141 Id. 
142 ALExANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
26 (1948). 
143 Id. at 18. 
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constitutional lodestar under pluralist democracy.144 In a stark about-face from the 
Court's consistent repudiation of First Amendment claims during the republican 
democratic era, the Justices began to uphold one free speech claim after another.145 
The principles of free expression and pluralist democracy are often combined 
to engender a mandate for government neutrality.146 If pluralist democracy arises 
from the recognition that the people harbor diverse interests and values (ethical 
relativism), 147 then the people must be allowed to express and advocate for their 
respective interests and values in the democratic arena.148 The government provides 
the framework of processes for people to express their views but cannot dictate the 
substance or content of those views.149 In 1943, the Court explained: "If there is any 
fiXed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."150 
II. FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS 
The interrelated historical evolutions of free expression and democracy shed light 
on the current campus free speech disputes, particularly those involving the granting 
of a platform to controversial speakers. A recent encounter at the Lewis and Clark Law 
School provides a useful illustration.151 The Federalist Society, 152 a conservative student 
organization, invited Christina HoffSommers, a philosopher and resident scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute, 153 to speak at Lewis and Clark.154 Sommers is well-
known for her inflammatory conservative political stances. 155 She questions the 
144 G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence ofFree Speech 
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1996). 
1
" See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is pro-
tected free speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating a conviction for 
distributing handbills); Haguev. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307U.S. 496,517 (1939) (upholding 
the right ofuoions to organize in the streets). 
146 See SANDEL, supra note 15, at 28 (emphasizing demaods for govemmeot neutrality). 
147 FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 396. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 W. Virginia St.Bd. ofEduc. v.Barnette,319U.S. 624, 642(1943). "[A]boveallelse, the 
FirstAmendmeotmeaos that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."PoliceDep'tv. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,95 (1972). 
151 Scott Jaschik, Speech, Interrupted, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.in 
sidehighered.com/news/2018/03/06/stodents-interrupt-several-portions-speech-christina-hoff 
-summers [http:/ /perma.cc/ZQ2G-SQYC]. 
152 For a discussion on the development and operation of the Federalist Society, see SlEVEN 
M. TEIES, THERisEOFTilECONSERVATIVELEGALMOVEMENT 135--80 (2008). 
153 Christina Hoff Sommers, AEI, https://www.aei.org/scholar/christina-hoff-sommers 
[http://permacc/W3MQ-698H] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
154 Jaschik, supra note 151. 
'" Id. 
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usefulness of women's studies departments, the reality of a wage gap between women 
and men, and the need to advocate against sexual assaults. 156 When she visited Lewis 
and Clark, a group of student protesters attempted to block the door to the room 
where Sommers was scheduled to speak.157 When the audience entered through a 
back entrance and Sommers began to speak, the protesters repeatedly interrupted the 
presentation, which nonetheless continued. 158 Some protesters sang, "Which side are 
you on, friends? Which side are you on? No platform for fascists, no platform at all. 
We will fight for justice until Christina's gone."159 The co-chair of the Lewis and 
Clark National Lawyers Guild Student Chapter explained her interest in protecting 
equality and inclusiveness: "I think first and foremost what's on my mind is protest-
ing giving a platform to someone who espouses essentially hate speech, male 
supremacy speech."160 
Many reacted angrily against the protesters and argued that they contravened the 
free speech rights of Sommers.161 Because Lewis and Clark, a private school, and 
its students do not represent the government, the protesters technically could not 
violate Sommers's constitutional rights. 162 Yet, the critics of these protesters reason-
ably invoked free speech values or norms, as do many disputants in these campus 
controversies.163 
156 See Christina Hoff Sommers, There Is No Gender Wage Gap, PRAGERU (Mar. 6, 2017); 
Jaschik, supra note 151; Scott London, The Future ofFeminism: An Interview With Christina 
HoffSommers, Scorr LONDON, http://www.scottlondon.com/interviews/sonnners.html [http:/ I 
perma.cc/A5FW-UB83] Qast visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
157 Jaschik, supra note 151. 
"' Id. 
'" Id. 
160 Protesters Disrupt Speech by Author at Lewis & Clark Law School, STATESMAN J. 
(Mar. 7, 2018), https:/ lwww.statesmanjournal.com/stmy/news/20 18/03/07 /protesters-disrupt 
-speech-author-lewis-clar-law-school/404865002 [http://perma.cc/4256-AFRD]. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 795, 798--802 (1993) (emphasizing 
equality when discussing campus hate speech). 
161 Mairead McArdle, Law-School Students Shout Dawn 'Known Fascist' Christino Hoff 
Sommers, NAT'LREv. (Mar. 6, 2018, 11:04 AM), https:/lwww.nationalreview.com/2018/03 
/christina-hoff-sonnners-lewis-clark-law-studenls-shout-<lown [http:/ /perma.cc!K8LW -CRDS]. 
162 WlllTTINGTON, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing relation between private schools and free 
speech issues). See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522 (1987) (applying the state-action doctrine). 
163 
"Although the First Amendment applies only to public universities, all colleges and univer-
sities should commit themselves to these [First Amendment] values." CIIEMERINSKY & 
GillMAN, supra note 5, at 20; Charlotte Hays, 'Freedom ofSpeech 'Is Too Sophisticated a Con-
cept for Today 's Illiberal Students, lilEHIIL (Mar. 9, 2018), https://thehillcom/opinionleduca 
tion/377648-freedom-<lf-speech-is-too-sophisticated-a-concept-for-todays-illiberal [http:/ /penna 
.cc/5FJS-7SJX]. See CIIEMERINSKY & GillMAN, supra note 5, at 71-73 (arguing against no-
platform policies); McArdle, supra note 161 (noting that the Federalist Society maintained 
that Sommers stood for free expression). 
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A. Free Speech Criticisms of the Protesters 
Critics typically articulate several overlapping free expression arguments to re-
proach protesters. First, critics start with a presumption that expression should be pro-
tected: let the controversial speaker express her views; if the protesters disagree with the 
speaker, then they should respond in kind, by expressing their own countering views. 164 
In other words, critics maintain that protesters should operate within the marketplace 
of ideas in a societal search for troth.165 Good ideas are the appropriate response to bad 
ideas; the protesters should express their disagreement by using counter-speech rather 
than suppression (for instance, shouting down an invited speaker). 166 In the Lewis and 
Clark situation, the protesters should have allowed Sommers to complete her presenta-
tion, and then, if they disagreed, the protesters should have voiced their own alternative 
ideas. Tbrough this orderly exchange of ideas, society supposedly will move closer 
to the truth.167 If anything, a campus should epitomize the marketplace of ideas.168 
Even if the speaker offends the protesters, the critics continue, the First Amend-
ment does not allow the punishment or suppression of offensive expression.169 
People speak and write all sorts of nasty and even purposefully cruel epithets, some 
of which might diminish equality and inclusiveness (for example, in a campus com-
munity). 170 Yet, suffering through such offenses is the price of free expression.171 
Otherwise, the government would become a censor, specifying which pronounce-
ments are too offensive and which are acceptable. 172 The government, though, must 
remain neutral about the content of messages.173 
For example, the Court held in Cohen v. California114 that the defendant's 
conviction for disturbing the peace violated the First Amendment.175 To protest the 
164 See BEN-PORAIH, supra note 5, at 39. 
16
' See MARTIN P. GOLDING, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 16-17 (2000). 
166 BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at39; CIIEMERINSKY &GilLMAN, supra note 5, at 19-20; 
PALFREY, supra note 5, at 17; WIITITINGTON, supra note 5, at 28-50. For a critique of the 
marketplace of ideas, see DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note I, at 33-39. 
167 See GOLDING, supra note 165, at 16-17. 
168 Id. at 15-18; Wlll1TINGTON, supra note 5, at 6, 29. 
169 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (20ll)(reasoning that the First Amendment 
protects "even hurtful speech on public issues"). 
170 Although they argue to protect free expression, Chemerinsky and Gilhnan acknowledge 
the need to trY to protect equality and inclusiveness on campuses. CiJEMERINSKY & GillMAN, 
supra note 5, at ix-x, I. 
171 Id. at 72-73. "Our position is absolute: campuses never can censor or punish the ex-
pression of ideas, however offensive, because otherwise they cannot perfurm their function of 
promoting inquiry, discovery, and the dissemination of new knowledge." !d. at 19-20. 
172 !d. at 73. 
173 
"The platform that campuses provide is designed to be an open platform, not one 
reserved for those who are thinking correct thoughts." I d. at 73. See DELGADO & STEF ANCIC, 
supra note I, at 53-{)2 (criticizing free speech absolutism). 
174 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
m Id. at 26. 
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military draft during the Vietnam War, Cohen had worn into a courthouse a jacket 
inscribed with the message, "Fuck the Draft. "176 The Court acknowledged that ''freedom 
[of expression] may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive 
utterance. "177 But chaotic and insulting statements are "necessary side effects of the 
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve."178 
After all, the Court reasoned, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."179 The govern-
ment therefore must remain neutral.180 Ultimately, "[t]hat the air may at times seem 
filled with verbal cacophony is ... not a sign of [national] weakness but of strength. "181 
As critics have explained, the Lewis and Clark situation and similar no-plat-
forming disputes resonate with hostile audience cases.182 In a hostile audience scenario, 
a speaker's words inflame an unfriendly audience to a point where some in the 
audience might react violently. 183 In such scenarios, should the police either, on the 
one hand, halt and arrest the speaker (for provoking potential violence) or, on the 
other hand, control the crowd and protect the speaker (thus allowing the speaker to 
continue)? To be sure, in one such case, decided in 1951, the Court upheld a speaker's 
conviction for disorderly conduct.184 The Justices reasoned that the speaker's ex-
pression created a clear and present danger of violence and therefore was constitu-
tionally unprotected.185 But in more recent cases, the Court has effectively required the 
police to try reasonably to protect the speakers from a hostile audience.186 The vehe-
mence of hecklers cannot terminate a speaker's First Amendment rights.187 Thus, in 
the Lewis and Clark situation, school officials (acting in the role of government of-
ficials) should have protected the right of the speaker, Sommers, to complete her pre-
sentation. if protesters insisted on interfering, the school should have punished them.188 
176 !d. at 16. 
177 !d. at 24--25. 
178 Id. at 25. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. at 25-26. 
181 Id. at 25. 
182 SeeR George Wright, TheHeclder's Veto Today, 68CASEW.REs.L.REv.l59, 161-09, 
178--84 (2017) (summarizing hostile audience jurisprudence and relating it to campus free 
speech disputes). 
183 See id. at 160. 
184 Feinerv. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
1
" See id. at 319--20. 
186 See Gregoryv. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112(1969); Coxv. Louisiana, 379U.S. 536,558 
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-3 8 (1963). For a discussion emphasizing 
the heckler's veto in campus free speech disputes, see Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Does Disruption Violate Free Speech?, C!!RON. HIGHER EDuc. (Oct. 17, 20 17), https:/ /www 
.chronicle.com/article/Does-Disruption-VioJ.ate.Free/241470 [http:/ /perma.cc/249J-2A3V]. 
187 See, e.g., Gregory, 394 U.S. at 121-22(Black, J.,concurriug)(discussingresponsibili-
ties of police). 
188 1be critics often condemn the protesters for being "snowflakes,'' see BEN-PORAIH, supra 
note 5, at 9, 117 nn.6-7 (citing examples of such comments), or as trying to enforce ''political 
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B. The Counterargument: From Democracy and Free Expression 
These arguments for the unequivocal protection of expression in the no-plat-
forming disputes, such as at Lewis and Clark, are mistaken in multiple ways. We 
should remember that, from a historical standpoint, free expression became a constitu-
tional lodestar only after the Court accepted pluralist democracy.189 During the 
republican democratic era, when Holmes, Brandeis, and free speech advocates empha-
sized the search-for-truth rationale (or marketplace of ideas theory), the majority of 
Justices continued to apply the bad tendency test and to conclude that expression was 
constitutionally unprotected. 190 Later on, in the late 193 Os and early 1940s, with the 
development of pluralist democracy and the correlative self-governance rationale, 
the Court began to validate free-expression claims under the First Amendment.191 
Significantly, then, critics (of the protesters) typically invoke the search-for-
truth rationale rather than the self-governance to justify absolute protection of 
expression, regardless of injurious potential or consequences.192 The critics insist that 
an invited speaker, even one spouting hate speech, has a protected right to speak.193 
If protesters want to respond, they should do so with counter-speech. 194 But given 
that Supreme Court Justices and other judges consistently found that the government 
could restrict expression despite the search-for-truth rationale, critics would fmd 
fmner ground if they could invoke the self-governance rationale, the springboard 
for the transformation of free expression into a constitutionallodestar.195 
In the context of campus free-expression disputes, however, the application of 
the self-governance rationale is problematic. Pluralist democratic theory requires full 
and equal participation for all citizens.196 The preeminent theorist of pluralist democ-
racy, Robert A. Dahl, specified the processes requisite to the operation of a demo-
cratic process.197 For instance, each individual vote must be given an identical weight, 
and the option receiving the greatest number of votes wins. 198 Dahl emphasized, 
correctness." Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, I 01 MINN. 
L. REv. 1987, 1988-93 (2017). 
189 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
190 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
191 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
192 See GOWING, supra note 165, at 16-17. 
193 See id. 
194 See PALFREY, supra note 5, at 17. 
195 The search-for-truth counter-speech argument has other serious problems. See discus-
sion infra Section II.B. 
196 See FEWMAN, supra note 13, at 396. 
197 See IRAKATZNELSON,DESOLATION ANDENUGIITENMENT 107-76 (2003) (arguing that 
Dahl and several other post-World War II scholars soughtto articulate an approach to politics 
and democracy that made sense in the shadow of recent world tragedies). 
198 DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 121, at 67; DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 121, at 59. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 121, at I 09-11 
(discussing voting equality). 
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though, that "effective participation" is the most important component of democracy.199 
Citizens must have "adequate" and "equaf' opportunities "for expressing their pref-
erences . . . for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for 
endorsing one outcome rather than another."200 According to Dahl, in other words, 
free expression derives its import from the crucial demand for full and equal partici-
pation in the democratic arena. 201 Free expression allows citizens to participate effec-
tively in democracy. From this perspective, equal democratic participation is primary; 
free expression is secondary.202 
Although Dahl emphasized the democratic process, he did not intend to suggest 
that democracy is solely a matter of process. He has always insisted that pluralist 
democracy cannot be sustained without democratic norms--a cultore of democracy. 203 
1f citizens are not widely committed to the rules of the democratic game-negotiation, 
compromise, and coalition-building-then the political community will splinter into 
sharply polarized interest groups. 204 Hence, when Dahl underscored participation in 
democracy, he was not referring to a purely formal right of participation. To the 
contrary, citizens must be personally and culturally vested in democratic norms as 
well as having sufficient resources to participate. 205 People who lack the fundamentals 
of housing, education, or medical care cannot fully engage in political discussion and 
participation regardless of their desire to play by the rules of the game. 206 
Consequently, pluralist democracy contains inherent substantive limits or con-
ditions. For instance, ifthe crux of the democratic process is effective participation, 
then a legislatore cannot constitutionally enact a law that would abridge some citizens' 
abilities and opportunities to participate--even if a supermajority of citizens and 
legislators followed the proper processes in enacting the law. Certain govermnent 
actions must be off the table, beyond democratic debate, because they would con-
travene the conditions necessary for robust pluralist democracy. All individuals, 
regardless of subculture or societal grouping, must be treated as full and equal 
citizens in good standing.'07 Even if a supermajority of Americans were to support 
199 DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 121, at 109. 
200 Id. 
201 See id. at 170. 
202 See id. at 169-75 (discussing free speech and other rights integral to the democratic 
process). 
203 DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 48-49. 
204 DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITics, supra note 121, at 172; DAHL, DEMOCRATIC 
THEoRY, supra note 121, at4. See DANIELJ.BOORSTIN, THEGENIUSOFAMER!CANPOUTICS 
162 (1953) (emphasizing a "genuine community of our values"); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE 
GoVERNMENTAL PROCESS 129, 138,512-13 (1951) (emphasizing the rules ofthe game for 
democracy). 
205 See DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC, supra note 121, at 150-52. 
206 See id. at 132-33 (maintaining that liberty and equality are not in opposition); DAHL, 
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 46 (emphasizing relative economic well-being). 
207 See JEREMY WAlDRON, THEIIARMINHATE SPEECH5, 60-61 (2012)(discussingthe 
relation between hate speech and being a citizen in good standing). 
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a law discriminating against a racial minority, such government action must be 
unconstitutional because it would relegate the racial minority to second-class demo-
cratic citizenship. 208 
As Dahl underscored, whenever we raise the issue of constitutional rights, we 
implicitly ask the question, "rights for whom?'"09 In other words, who belongs to 
and can participate in the political community?210 Under republican democracy, this 
question led to a focus on civic virtue. 211 Supposedly, only those individuals virtuous 
enough to pursue the common good rather than their own private interests were 
entitled to full and equal citizenship, to rights to speak and vote. 212 But under pluralist 
democracy, full and equal citizenship for all individuals is a premise of the srstem.213 
Without full and equal citizenship, allowing for equal political participation for all, then 
pluralist democracy does not exist.214 In Dahl's words, "The demos must include all 
adult members except transients and persons proven to be mentally defective. "215 
John Hart Ely's constitutioual theory of representation reinforcement--and the 
criticisms of it-underscore that the definition of democracy must include a substan-
tive element; democracy cannot be reduced solely to processes.216 In fact, though, 
Ely argued that representation-reinforcement theory was purely process-based; when 
208 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating a Michigan law prohib-
iting same-sex marriages); Osamudia R James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REv. 127, 
147-63 (2017) (arguing for the need to recognize the identity of societal groups in equal 
protection). 
209 DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 121, at 132-33. 
210 An implicit and correlative substantive question is what counts as participation. To some 
extent, Dahl's discussions of the prerequisites or conditions for a democratic process answer 
this question. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRiTics, supra note 121, at 109-11, 169-75. 
Ultin3ately, then, the procedural and substantive components of democracy necessarily inter-
twine. We Cam3ot fully discuss democracy without accounting for process and substance. See 
SMITH, supra note 27, at 491 (emphasizing that it is "morally imperative" to recognize the func-
tions of political communities). 
211 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 22. 
212 Id. at 15, 22. 
213 See DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC, supra note 121, at 136. 
214 See id. at 135-37 (emphasizing political equality as an anchor for democracy); Emanuela 
Lombardo & Petra Meier, Good Symbolic Representation: The Relevance of Inclusion, 51 
POL. SCI. & POL. 327 (2018) (emphasizing that inclusion is normative or substantive). 
215 DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 59-60. See Karen Celis & Sarah 
Childs, Good Representatives and Good Representation, 51 PoL. Sa. &PoL. 314 (2018) (discus-
sing how to measure political equality in the form of good democratic representation); Eline 
Severs & Suzanne Dov~ Why We Need To Return To the Ethics of Political Representation, 
51 POL. SCI. &POL. 309 (2018) (discussing the same). 
216 See ELY, supra note 128, at 101--02, 181. For criticisms, see Paul Brest, TJie Substance 
ofProcess, 42 OinOST.L.J.131 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The PastofConstitutional TJieory--
And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 223 (1981 ); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: 
The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). 
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the Court exercises its power of judicial review, reviewing the constitutionality of 
a legislative action, the Court should "police" the democratic process but should 
never enunciate or enforce substantive principles or values.'17 Only the legislature, 
when following the proper pluralist democratic processes, could determine appropriate 
communal goals (or values). 218 When reviewing the constitutionality of a legislative 
action, the Court needed tu defer to the legislative action so long as the democratic 
process had been fair and open--regardless of the substantive content of the legisla-
tive action.219 But if the democratic process had been defective, then the Court should 
deem the legislative action unconstitutional. 220 
The Court, Ely explained, can police the democratic process in two ways. 221 
First, the Court can clear the channels of political change.222 Political "ins" cannot 
be allowed to protect their power by choking the channels of political change and 
permanently excluding the political "outs. "223 Denying or diluting the right to vote 
through legislative malapportionment is a "quintessential stoppage" in the demo-
cratic process and therefore unconstitutional. 224 Second, the Court can facilitate the 
representation of minorities. 225 Democratic representatives cannot be allowed to 
systematically disadvantage minorities because of hostility or prejudice. The 
democratic process malfunctions if everyone is not "actually or virtually repre-
sented.'m6 Therefore, when a legislature intentionally discriminates against a mi-
nority for an improper motive, such as racial hostility, the Court should fmd the 
legislative action unconstitutional. 227 
As numerous critics pointed out, however, Ely's representation-reinforcement 
theory was not purely process-based.228 Political battles in pluralist democracy al-
ways produce winners and losers;229 some societal groups win while others lose. Yet 
Ely argued that the Court should police the democratic process by facilitating the 
217 ELY, supra note 128, at 73-104, I 06 (emphasizing representation-reinforcement theory 
as process-based). 
218 See id. at 103. 
219 
"The day is gone when this Court [strikes down ]laws ... because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out ofharmony with a particular school of thought" Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 
220 In Harper v. Virginia Board qfE/ections, the Court held that poll taxes in state elections 
were unconstitutional because, according to Ely, such taxes prevented some citizens from parti-
cipating fully in the democratic process. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See ELY, supra nute 128, at 120. 
221 See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text. 
222 ELY, supra note 128, at 105-34. 
223 Id. at 103. 
224 See id. at 117. 
225 Id. at 135-79. 
226 See id. at 101. 
227 See id. at 101, 117. 
228 For a list of critics, see supra note 216. 
229 See discussion irifi"a Section liLA. 
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representation ofminorities.230 To do so, the Court itselfhad to differentiate among the 
numerous societal groups that had lost in the pluralist democratic arena. 231 The Court 
designated some such groups as discrete and insular minorities deserving special judi-
cial protection while deeming other groups mere losers in the democratic process.232 But 
this judicial designation of discrete and insular minorities required the Court to en-
gage in exactly those substantive value choices supposedly forbidden by representation-
reinforcement theory; the Court needed to differentiate among the various groups of 
democratic losers. 233 Rather than remaining neutral among societal groups (and their 
respective values and interests), the Court was designating some groups for special 
judicial protection. One critic, Paul Brest, commented that Ely had articulated a 
process-based constitutional theory so artfully that his failure unwittingly demon-
strated its impossibility: "John Hart Ely has come as close as anyone could to 
proving that it can't be done.'"34 The criticisms of Ely's representation-reinforcement 
theory underscore that we cannot discuss democracy as solely a matter of process. 235 
We must also discuss the status of different societal groups within the democratic 
community-a substantive issue. Do all groups have full and equal standing?236 
Understanding the substantive component of pluralist democracy is crucial to 
analyzing campus free-<ll<prtlssion controversies, particularly no-platforming disputes. 
Even though political speech and writing, in general, is robustly protected because 
of the self-governance rationale, 237 the reason for constitutionally protecting such 
expression is to preserve democracy."' If campus speakers are allowed to denigrate 
or denounce historically marginalized groups (or individual members of such 
groups), then those targeted groups and individuals are pushed into a diminished 
democratic status. Some individuals, when thrust into such second-class positions, 
will react by remaining silent. 239 Others will hazard to participate, to speak or write, 
yet their words and ideas must overcome the disadvantages of a diminished communal 
status. As Jeremy Waldron explained: "The issue is ... the harm done to individuals 
and groups through the disfiguring of our social environment by visible, public, and 
230 ELY, supra note 128, at 120. 
231 See id. at 151-53. 
232 Id. 
233 Brest, supra note 216, at 140. See Parker, supra note 216, at 234-35 (arguing similarly). 
234 Brest, supra note 216, at 142. 
235 See SANDEL, supra note 15, at 274-316 (emphasizing the difficulties of a procedural 
republic). 
236 See SlEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZmLATI, How DEMOCRACIES DIE 97-100 (2018) 
(emphasizing the need to enhance and protect democratic norms in order to protect demo-
cratic govermnent); James, supra note 208, at 128-29 (emphasizing the importance of societal 
identity in equal protection). 
237 See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text. 
239 See BEN-PORAIH, supra note 5, at 43 (discussing the potential for silencing outsiders 
on a campus). 
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semi-permanent announcements to the effect that in the opinion of one group in the 
community, perhaps the majority, members of another group are not worthy of equal 
citizenship. "240 A fair and open democratic dialogue or exchange of ideas is impossi-
ble if social power is skewed before the dialogue even begins.241 
In short, expression that diminishes the full and equal status of marginalized groups 
or their members within the political community is not worthy of constitutional value 
and should not be protected under the First Amendment. Full and equal citizenship for 
marginalized groups should not be treated as if it were an issue open for debate. Equal 
citizenship for marginalized groups should be treated as among the "settled features 
of the social environment to which we are visibly and pervasively conunitted. "242 Cru-
cially, then, in the context of the no-platforming disputes, counter-speech cannot suffi-
ciently respond to right-wing provocateurs who spout hate speech or otherwise 
denigrate outsiders. Counter-speech legitimates debate about the issue of full and equal 
citizenship. Counter-speech suggests that we ought to be engaged in conversation 
with those who would label and treat marginalized groups as second-class citizens. 
But there is no conversation to be had. We no longer need to try to persuade racists, 
sexists, homophobes, or anyone else that all citizens deserve full and equal membership 
in the polity. The conversation is over and off the table--or at least it should be. 
Furthermore, to show that hate speech and the like are outside constitutional 
protection in specific contexts, nobody should need to prove that such expression 
creates imminent danger, psychological injury, risk of illegal conduct, or anything 
else. 243 The problem with such expression does not lie in its potential harmful con-
sequences. Instead, the problem lies in the reality that such expression necessarily 
and inherently contravenes the requisite substantive conditions for pluralist democ-
racy. Or to rephrase, the harmful consequence of such expression is precisely that 
it undermines democracy, regardless of any other consequences.244 
From this perspective, the government (or a university or college) cannot remain 
neutral and should not try to do so. Because pluralist democracy contains inherent 
substantive limits or conditions, 245 government cannot be neutral. The government 
240 WAlDRON, supra note 207, at 33. 
241 See id. at 33, 47. 
242 Id at95. See DaraZ. Strolovitch& Cbaya Y. Crowder, Respectability, Anti-Respectability, 
and Intersectionally Responsible Representation, 51 PoL. SCI. & PoL. 340 (2018) (arguing 
that marginalized groups should not need to prove their worthiness in accord with main-
stream values). 
243 See W AIDRON, supra note 207, at 96--97 (rejecting the judicial use of a doctrine such 
as the clear and present danger test in cases of hate speech). 
244 For discussions of why hate speech should be constitotionally unprotected, see Richard 
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racia/Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers Let Him Go: 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431; Marl J. Matsuda, Public Re-
sponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989). 
245 See supra notes 201--07 and accompanying text. 
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should affirmatively nurture democratic culture and should ensure that all citizens can 
fully and equally participate in the polity (or campus community). 246 If the government 
allows a speaker to spout epithets that target a marginalized group, the government is 
not neutral.247 To the contrary, the government is facilitating the demeaning of the 
targeted group within the political community. The ability of that group and its mem-
bers to speak and otherwise participate within the community will necessarily be 
diminished. 248 In other words, a pluralist democratic government cannot merely pro-
vide an abstract framework of procedures that allows individuals to voice and assert 
their respective interests and values, regardless of the content of those interests and 
values. Certain questions--including substantive mattets---must be off the table if a 
pluralist democracy is to exist. Most important, all individuals, regardless of subcul-
ture or societal grouping, must be treated as full and equal citizens in good standing. 
III. HISTORY REDUX: THE POLffiCS OF FREE SPEECH 
When it comes to the politics of free expression, history once again provides a 
sharp dose of reality. Free expression has never been neutral in American society.249 
It has never been equally enjoyed by all.250 To be sure, many Americans have reveled 
in their own expressive liberties, but often those same Americans have purposefully 
suppressed the speech and writings of other Americans, both officially (through 
government processes) and unofficially (through nongovernment processes, such as 
tar and feathering). 251 In many such instances, judicial pronouncements of constitu-
tional doctrine have proven to be beside the point. 252 To a large degree, a practical 
rule of free expression in America is that marginalized outsiders typically lose while 
the wealthy and mainstream usually win. 253 If margiualized outsiders assert their 
First Amendment rights to speak, courts hold it against them: sorry, no free speech 
rights here. 254 But when individuals who are wealthy or in the mainstream assert free 
246 See SMITH, supra note 27, at 12 (arguing that egalitarians need "to give up conceiving 
of good governments as bloodless neutral umpires of private activities and preexisting rights''). 
247 Id. 
248 
"[F]ree speech advocates who insist [on] ... open-minded free inquiry'' igoore the reality 
that ''when many on campus are effectively silenced, inquiry is in fact neither free nor open-
minded." BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at 43. 
249 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
250 See discussion i'!fra Section III.A. 
251 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
252 FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 3-5. 
253 See PALFREY, supra note 5, at 14 ("[T]he rigbtto free expression has been a tool of em-
powered people, not those who have been marginalized.''); Mark A. Graber, Constitutional 
Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected Relationship, 27 LAw 
& SOC. INQUIRY 309, 310 (2002) ("[llhe outliers in American politics were more ofteo than 
not the victims than the beoeficiaries" of the Court's decisions). 
254 See i'1fra notes 312-42 and accompanying text. 
2019] BROKEN PLATFORMS, BROKEN COMMUNITIES? 975 
speech rights, courts are likely to declare the importance ofFirst Amendment guaran-
teesandtofindtheexpressionconstitutionally~enifthespeechdenigrates 
or attacks marginalized outsiders. 255 This phenomenon-that marginalized outsiders 
typically lose while the wealthy and mainstream usually win-was true during the 
republican democratic era and has continued to hold true during the pluralist demo-
cratic era, even though free expression is supposed to be a constitutionallodestar.256 
Examples are too numerous to cover comprehensively, but a few illustrations suffice 
to make the point. 257 
A. Winners and Losers 
As early as the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that outsiders risked social 
and legal punishments if they voiced their views. 258 An individual was free to speak or 
write so long as he remained roughly within the broad mainstream of culture and 
opinion, but penalties were severe for those who ventured outside those parameters. 259 
"In America the majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion," 
Tocqueville wrote.260 "[W]ithin these barriers an author may write what he pleases, 
but woe to him if he goes beyond them. Not that he is in danger of an auto-da-fe, but 
he is exposed to continued obloquy and persecution.'"'' For example, religious minori-
ties in many states lived with the threat that speaking contrary to mainstream Protestant 
viewpoints might provoke a prosecution for blasphemy.262 A Delaware court, up-
holding a blasphemy conviction in 183 7, explained that it had "been long perfectly 
settled by the common law, that blasphemy against the Deity in general, or a malicious 
and wanton attack against the christian religion individually, for the purpose of 
exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is indictable and punishable .... "263 
An egregious instance of suppression involved the origins of the Church ofJesus 
Christ ofl.atter-Day Saints.264 Joseph Smith, Jr., founded the Mormon movement in 
"' See infra notes 302-32 and accompanying text. 
256 See White, supra note 144, at 300-01. 
257 For a more extensive discussion, see FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 70-152, 209-40, 
420--62. 
258 1 ALExiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA264 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry 
Reeve trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1835). 
259 See id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 In accord with America's inegalitarian ascriptive tradition, non-Protestants have often 
been targeted for suppression and persecution. See, e.g., SMTIH, supra note 27, at 75-76. 
263 Statev. Chandler, 2Del (2Harr.) 553,555 (1837). According to a South Carolina court, 
"[ a]ll blasphemous publications, carrying upon their face that irreverent rejection ofGod and his 
holy religion, which makes them dangerous to the community, have always been held to be 
libels, and punishable at common law." City Council v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 524 
(1848) (convicting Jewish defendant for violating Sunday law). See LEONARD W. LEvY, BLAS-
PHEMY 400-23 (1993) (discussing state blasphemy cases from pre-Civil War America). 
264 See irifi"a notes 265-73 and accompanying text. 
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upstate New York during the frrst part of the nineteenth century.'65 He wrote the 
Book of Mormon in 1830.266 In it, Smith incorporated the history ofEuropean coloni-
zation of America into Christian eschatology; Mormonism, that is, was to supplant 
mainstream Christianity, just as early Christianity had been intended to supplant 
Judaism (according to the New Testament).267 Given such religious views, many 
Americans feared that Mormonism threatened the predominant forms ofProtestant-
ism as well as republican democracy.268 Persecution of the Mormons was common 
and often violent, forcing Smith's followers to move from state to state as they sought 
refuge. 269 From New York, Smith went to Ohio, where he was eventually dragged from 
his house to be tarred and feathered.270 Smith moved on to Jackson County, Missouri, 
where mob violence again forced him to flee, this time to northern Missouri.271 
Further violence led the Mormons next to Illinois, where Smith was arrested, then 
in June 1844, murdered while he was awaiting tria1.272 Smith's successor, Brigham 
Young, finally led the community to the Great Salt Lake area where they established 
the autonomous State of Deseret, 273 only to become embroiled with the federal 
government in legal struggles that would stretch on for decades. 274 
265 SYDNEY E. AHLs1ROM,AREI.JGIOUSHISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 501--02 (1972). 
266 !d. at 502. 
267 !d. JON BUTI.ER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHiuSTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPlE 
242 {1990); NA1HAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHiuSTIANITY 
114-15 (1989). 
268 See AHLS1ROM, supra note 265, at 557. 
269 Id. at 505--06 
270 !d. at 505. 
271 !d. at 505--06. 
272 Id. at 506. 
273 !d. at 506--07; ERIC MICHAEL MAzuR, THE AMERICANIZATION OF REI.JGIOUS MI-
NORITIES: CONFRONTING THE CONSTITIJTIONAL ORDER 69--89 (1999). 
274 
'Throughout the nineteenth centwy, many states explicitly limited the civil rights of Jews, 
often long after the state-established churches had been eliminated. In the early nineteenth cen-
twy, Jews could practice law in only four states: Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and 
New York. FREDERIC CoP!E JAHER, A SCAPEGOAT IN THE NEW WilDERNESS: THE ORIGINS 
AND RisE OF ANTI-SEMIT1SM IN AMERICA 121 {1994). In Maryland, Jews were proscribed 
from holding public office until 1826, when the law was liberalized. CONSTITIJTION OF 
MARYLAND {1776), reprinted in I THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITIJTIONS, COWNIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 817, 820 {Ben Perley Poore 
ed., 2ded. 1878) [hereinafter I POORE]. Jewsthenconldholdoffice, butonlyiftheydeclared 
a "belief in a future state of rewards and punishments."Final Form of the "Jew Bill" (1826), 
reprinted in THE JEWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1840, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 53, 
53 (Joseph L. Blau & SaloW. Barron eds., 1963). This bill was incorporated into the Maryland 
Constitution of 1851. See CONSTITIJTION OF MARYLAND (1851 ), reprinted in I POORE, supra, 
at 83 7, 839. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 limited public officeholding to those 
individuals who accepted "the truth of the Protestautreligion." CONSTITIJTION OF NORTH CARG-
LINA{1776), reprinted in 2 THEFEDERALAND STATECONSTITIJTIONS, COWNIALCHARTERS, 
AND0THER0RGANICLAWSOFTHEUNITED STATES 1409, 1413-14 [hereinafter 2 POORE]. 
This provision, as amended in 1835 tu allow all Christians to hold public office, remained in 
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During the nineteenth century, African Americans constituted the single societal 
group that endured the most severe suppression, "given the preservation of slavery 
as a legal institution.'ms Even free blacks lacked the civil rights of white citizens, 
as the Supreme Court held inDred Scottv. Sandford,216 decided in 1857.277 Slaves, 
of course, were subjected to the most sweeping legal disabilities."' Unsurprisingly, 
then, free expression was deemed a right inconsistent with the status of a slave. 279 
Meanwhile, many abolitionists were suppressed, often violently, for voicing opposi-
tion to slavery, especially in the southern and border states.>•• 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, immigrants were subject 
to multiple forms of suppression. Anthony Comstock led a vigorous anti-obscenity 
campaign that often targeted immigrant communities and inflamed mainstream fears 
of the ostensibly un-American values of inunigrants!" During this era, factory 
workers, many of whom were immigrants, also faced suppression if they attempted 
to organize and form labor unions;282 courts consistently enjoined picketing and 
other forms of expression that might facilitate unionizing!" Likewise, the World 
War I Espionage Act prosecutions often targeted inunigrants, Socialists, and other 
societal outsiders. 284 The defendants in Debs v. United States and Schenck v. United 
States were Socialists;"' the defendant in Frohwerk v. United States286 was the editor 
of a German-language newspaper;287 and all of the defendants in Abrams v. United 
States were Russian-Jewish inunigrants!" 
effect until 1868. See AMENDMENTS TO TilE CONS1TTUI10N OF 1776, reprinted in 2 POORE, 
supra, at 1415, 1418 (allowing all Christians to hold office); CONS1TTUI10N OF NORTH 
CAROLINA(1868), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra, at 1419, 1430 (this Constitution still barred 
"all persons who shall deny the being of Almighty God"); MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TuRKS, 
AND INFIDELS 42-50 (1984). 
275 FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 121. 
276 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
277 !d. at 404-05. 
278 See JACOB D. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL 'fREATISEONTIIELAWOF SLAVERY 190-200 
(1837) (discussing the legal incapacities of slaves); WATSON, supra note 35, at 22 (noting that 
slaves had ''no rights of any kind''). 
279 See Bob v. State, 32 Ala. 560, 565 (1858). 
28° For a discussion on abolitionist suppression, see RUSSEll.. B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND TilE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860 (1949); see also FElDMAN, 
supra note 13, at 121-42. On the importance of race and whiteness in immigration laws, see 
IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006). 
281 FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 210-15. 
282 !d. at 175-76. 
283 Id. at 228-29. 
284 !d. at 252. 
285 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919); Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 
47, 49 (1919). 
286 249 u.s. 204 (1919). 
287 !d. at 205. 
288 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919). 
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Even after the transition to pluralist democracy and the enhancement of First 
Amendment protections, societal outsiders frequently suffered both official and 
unofficial forms of suppression. The Court upheld punishments of Communists, 289 
civil rights protesters, 290 and Vietnam War protesters. 291 A comparison of two hostile 
audience cases from the post-World War ll era illustrates the typical judicial treat-
ment of marginalized groups. In Terminiello v. Chicago,292 a hostile audience case 
decided in 1949, the Supreme Court concluded that the speaker-defendant's convic-
tion under a disorderly conduct ordinance violated the First Amendment.293 The 
constitutionally protected expression was an antisemitic diatribe. 294 The defendant 
had condemned "atheistic, communistic Jewish or Zionist Jews."295 He claimed that 
Jewish doctors had performed atrocities on Germans, and he asked, "Do you wonder 
[that] they were persecuted in other countries ... ?"296 Then he proclaimed that "we 
want them to go back where they came from."297 Yet, two years later, when the Court 
decided another hostile audience case, Feiner v. New York,298 the Court found the 
speech unprotected. 299 The speaker-defendant was a college student who had spoken 
to a racially mixed crowd of seventy-five to eighty whites and blacks gathered to-
gether on a sidewalk in Syracuse, NewYork.300 He had encouraged the audience to 
attend a meeting of the Young Progressives of America, protested the city's cancel-
lation of a permit for an earlier Young Progressives meeting, and made derogatory 
remarks about "President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, 
and other local political officials."301 The Court held that the First Amendment did 
not protect this speech because it created a clear and present danger'02 ---tlven though 
289 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding criminal convictions ofthe 
leaders of the United States Communist Party for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of 
the United States). 
290 Adderleyv. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding the trespassing conviction of students 
for demonstrating on jailhouse grounds against the arrest of other students who had been pro-
testing segregation). See Walkerv. Birmingham, 388U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding criminal con-
tempt conviction ofMartin Luther King, Jr., without expressly reaching the free speech issue). 
291 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the conviction of an anti-war 
protestor for burning his Selective Service registration certificate). 
292 337 U.S. I (1949). 
293 !d. at 6. 
294 See id. at 20--21 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
295 Id. at 20. 
296 !d. 
297 !d. at 21. The speaker was a Roman Catholic priest. !d. at 14. In the context of the United 
States in the 1940s, one could possibly maintain that the Court protected the speech of a reli-
gious outsider. 
298 340 u.s. 315 (1951). 
299 Id. at 321. 
300 !d. at316. 
301 Jd.at317,324. 
302 Id. at 320--21. 
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the evidence suggested otherwise. 303 The Justices seemed especially worried that 
Feiner had urged African Americans to "rise up in arms and fight for equal rights."304 
Yet, witnesses had sworn that Feiner had instead encouraged his listeners to "rise 
up and fight for their rights by going arm in arm to the [Young Progressives meet-
ing], black and white alike. "305 
Hence, in Terminiello, the Court protected inflammatory antisemitic speech, 
while in Feiner, the Court allowed the punishment of speech largely criticizing public 
officials and encouraging African Americans to take political action.'06 To be sure, 
the Justices might not have intentionally discriminated against marginalized outsid-
ers in these cases. Regardless, in one case, Terminiello, the Court emphasized the 
principled First Amendment protection of expression-speech that attacked a 
marginalized group.'07 In the other case, Feiner, the Court found speech that threat-
ened the mainstream and elites to be unprotected.''' In sum, in cases involving in-
flammatory or vituperative expression, the communal statuses of the speaker and the 
targeted group have at least tacitly influenced the Justices. A crucial landmark free 
speech case of the twentieth century underscores this phenomenon. In Brandenburg 
v. Ohio,"' decided in 1969, the Court famously articulated its most speech-protec-
tive standard ever for determining when subversive advocacy or, more generally, 
speech inciting unlawful conduct, would be outside ofFirst Amendment protections 
and therefore punishable.'" Yet, one should not overlook that the defendant had 
spewed hate speech denouncing blacks and Jews. He had warned that "if our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Cauca-
sian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken."311 
While societal outsiders typically lose in free-expression disputes, the "haves" 
usually come out ahead.'12 Starting in the 1970s, the Court began to increase pro-
tection for wealth and the economic marketplace under the umbrella of the First 
303 While there was "some pushing and shoving ... and some angry muttering'' in the crowd, 
there were no fights or evidence of real "disorder." Id. at 330. (Douglas J., dissenting). One 
isolated audience member threatened to "get [Feiner] off there myself," id., but was not close 
enough to Feiner to carry out the threat. Id. at 326 (Black, J., dissenting). 
304 Id. at 317 (majority opinion). 
305 Id. at 324, 324 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting). 
306 Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 5, 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting), with 
Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321, 324, 324 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting). 
307 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. 
308 See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 317, 320-21. 
309 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
310 See GEOFFREY R STONE, PERILOUS TiMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 522-23 (2004) 
(discussing the implications of the Brandenburg decision). 
311 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-47. The defendant was a Ku Klux Klan leader, so he 
too was somewhat of an outsider during the time period of the late 1960s. I d. at 444. 
312 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAw. & Soc'YREv. 95 (1974) (discussing advantages ofthe wealthy and 
powerful in litigation). 
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Amendment. 313 One of the frrst cases to hold that commercial speech constituted 
protected expression linked advertising to pluralist democracy and the self-gover-
nance rationale. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Counci/,314 the Court held unconstitutional a state law prohibiting licensed pharma-
cists from advertising prescription-drug prices. 315 Democracy concerns the allocation 
of resources in society, the Court explained, but most resource-allocation decisions 
are made through the economic marketplace.316 "So long as we preserve a predomi-
nantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will 
be made through numerous private economic decisions. "317 The economic market-
place, from the Court's perspective, was a situs of democracy. Commercial speech 
or advertising seemed essential for self-governance, for "the proper allocation of 
resources in a free enterprise system."318 Spending money had become a form of 
democratic politics--of political expression, "[ a]dvertising, however tasteless and 
excessive it sometimes may seem, is ... dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. "319 Conse-
quently, government restrictions on advertising are "highly paternalistic" intrusions 
into the marketplace (and, in turn, democratic processes).320 
The Roberts Court has pushed to new heights the First Amendment protection 
of wealth and the marketplace, as demonstrated in a purported free speech case, 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Incorporated. 321 Data mining, including the gathering, analysis, 
and sale of data, is big business. 322 Sorrell arose from the gathering and use of medical 
data. 323 Pharmacies routinely record information about prescriptions, such as the 
doctor, the patient, and the dosage.324 In Vermont, IMS Health Incorporated bought 
this information, analyzed it, and sold reports to pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
which used the reports to market their drugs more effectively to doctors. 325 Vermont 
enacted a law to prevent pharmacies from selling this prescription information. 326 
313 See Valentinev. Cbrestensen, 316U.S. 52,54-55 (1942)(holdingthatcommercialad-
vertising was a low-value category subject to government regulation). The Court first changed 
directioninBige/owv. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,819-20 (1975)(holdingthatcommercialadver-
tising should no longer be deemed "unprotected per se''). 
314 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
315 Id. at 770. 
316 See id. at 765. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at 770. 
321 564 u.s. 552 (2011). 
322 BRUCESCHNEIER,DATAANDGOIJA1H:lilEHIDDENBATILESTOC0ll.ECTYOURDATA 
AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 39-53 (2015) (discussing data mining). 
323 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558. 
324 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010). 
325 Id. 
326 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557-{;0. 
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The legislature had two primacy purposes: first, to protect the privacy of patients and 
doctors, and second, to improve public health by, for example, encouraging doctors 
to prescribe drugs in their patients' best interests rather than because of effective 
pharmaceutical marketing.'27 In such circumstances, the Court could have easily 
concluded that the statute was a permissible exercise of the state's police power in 
regulating the economic marketplace.'" As such, the statute would not even raise 
a free speech issue. 329 But the Court instead reasoned that the statute raised an 
unusual commercial speech issue.'" Commercial speech cases typically involve ad-
vertising, and as the Court admitted, the statute in Sorrell did not restrict advertising 
per se. 331 Yet, the Court reasoned that the First Amendment not only applied but also 
required "heightened judicial scrutiny," which the state could not satisfY. 332 
The Roberts Court's most renowned First Amendment decision protecting wealth 
and the economic marketplace is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,'" 
which upheld (or created) a right for corporations to spend unlimited sums on po-
litical advertising.'34 After explaining that spending on political advertising consti-
tutes speech,335 and that free speech protections extend to corporations,'36 the Court 
emphasized that free expression must be a constitutional lodestar in American 
democracy, "[ s ]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy .... The right of 
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a 
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. "337 
The Court also invoked the search-for-truth rationale.'" Restrictions on corporate 
campaign expenditures, the Court reasoned, interfere "with the 'open marketplace' 
of ideas protected by the First Amendment. "339 But the Court appeared to confound 
the marketplace of ideas and the economic marketplace, "[t]he censorship we now 
confront is vast in its reach," the Court explained. 340 "The Government has 'muffle[ d] 
327 Id. at 572. 
328 Id. at 580-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
329 Id. at 581. 
330 Tire statute may appear like a ''mere commercial regulation." Id at 556. However, while 
''the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce ... from imposing 
incidental burdens on speech," the Court held that the statute was actually a commercial speech 
law that "impose[ d] a burden based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker." 
Id. at 567. 
331 Id. at 562-{;3. 
332 Id. at 557. 
333 558 u.s. 310 (2010). 
334 Id. at 365. 
'" Id. at 336-39. 
336 Id. at 340-42. 
337 Id. at 339. 
338 See id. at 354. 
339 CitizensUnitedv. FEC, 558U.S. 310,354 (2010)(quotingN.Y. StateBd. ofElections 
v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)). 
340 Id. 
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the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy. "'341 
Speech, from this perspective, does not emanate from people--that is, from citizens-
but from "segments of the economy."342 
B. Beyond Constitutional Principle 
What does this history, ranging from the early nineteenth century through the 
Roberts Court, have to do with the campus no-platfonning disputes? The history 
suggests that, in these campus disputes, we need to look beyond the constitutional 
principle and doctrines of free expression.343 In particular, who invites the controver-
sial speakers, and who pays for them? 
Universities and colleges, in fact, rarely invite speakers to campus; in most 
instances, a department or student organization extends an invitation.344 Significantly, 
then, conservative student organizations often purposefully manufacture these dis-
putes by inviting controversial speakers who push the boundaries of propriety and 
are likely to provoke outrage.345 With regard to the Federalist Society, the student 
organization that invited Sommers to Lewis and Clark Law School, the national orga-
nization maintains a Speakers Bureau, a list of approved speakers. 346 The student 
chapters decide whom to invite.347 Most importantly, the Federalist Society supplies 
funding; it sponsors lectures and other events, paying travel costs and honoraria 348 
341 Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540U.S. 93,257-58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)). 
342 Id. 
343 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1924-28 (arguing for free speech realism 
and a rejection offonnalism); Richard Delgado, Taward a Legal Realist View of the First 
Amendment, 113 HAR.v. L. REv. 778 (2000) (arguing the same). 
344 BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at 25. 
345 Id. at 7, 23; Joseph Russomanno, Speech on Campus: Haw America's Crisis in Confi-
dence Is Eroding Free Speech Values, 45HAsTINGSCONST.L.Q.273, 275 (2018) (discussing 
claims that conservative organizations choreograph free speech campus disputes). 
346 Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, SOURCEWATCH, https:/lwww 
.sourcewatch.org/index.phP/Federalist_ Society _for_ Law_ and _Public _Policy_ Studies [http:// 
perma.cc/2PAE-XGXE] [hereinafter Federalist Society]. 
347 Eugene B. Meyer, Letter From The President, in FEDERAliST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND 
PuBuc POUCY STUDIES: 2010 ANNuAL REPoRT 1, 1 (2010), https://fedsoc-cms-public.s3 
.amazonaws.com/update/pdf!kFrpiRa7RXgKX5yDUW:z;jKQFQy7eOrA9dmAQJWDkY.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YDD9-FQRK]. 
348 
"The Society's main purpose is to sponsor fair, serious, and open debate about the need 
to enhance individual freedom and the role of the courts in saying what the law is rather than 
what they wish it to be." Frequently Asked Questions, FEDERAliST SOC'Y, https://fedsoc.org 
/frequently-asked-<juestions [http://penna.cc/5MJ7 -QQ5K]. Ron Coleman, "a former Federalist 
Society chapter president," refers to the provision for speakers of''public platforms, honoraria 
and travel stipends." Ron Coleman, Comment To The Federalist Society Caves to "Rape Cul-
ture" Orthodoxy, MINDING 1ilE CAMPUS (Oct 19, 2014), https://www.mindingthecampus.org 
/201411 0/19/the-federalist-society-caves-to-rape-culture-orthodoxy/ [http://perma.cc/6SFC 
-J62Z]. For an example of a Federalist Society Stodent Division Speaker Reimbursement 
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And the organization is rolling in money; as of2014, it had received more than $52 
million in donations.'49 Funding comes from renowned conservative foundations 
such as the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, as well as from other sources.''" 
The organization enjoys such an abundance of resources that it can sponsor several 
hundred events each year while also covering travel costs for junior scholars seeking 
to present papers at workshops and conferences.'" This type of alignment of conserva-
tive student groups, well-funded national conservative organizations, and conservative 
campus speakers is fairly typical. 352 TheY oung America's Foundation facilitates the 
invitation of conservative speakers by student groups and then substantially covers 
the costs.'" When Ann Coulter was invited to University of California, Berkeley, 
the Foundation covered most of her $20,000 speaking fee.' 54 
This alignment of wealth and power behind a right-wing speaker like Sommers 
casts a shadow over the Lewis and Clark no-platforming dispute. Recall that critics 
of the protesters maintained that the appropriate response for those who disagreed 
with Sommers was counter-speech: They should have responded in kind by express-
ing their own alternative views. 355 According to the critics, that is, protesters should 
have operated within the marketplace of ideas in a societal search for truth. 356 The 
problem with this approach, also advocated by numerous constitutional scholars,'" 
is that it blinks reality. It pretends that we live and express ourselves in something 
akin to a Habermasian ideal speech situation.'" According to Jiirgen Habermas, an 
ideal speech situation is a counterfactual intersubjective encounter that is cleansed 
of domination, coercion, and other distortions, such as economic power.'" As such, 
Request Form, covering travel expenses and honoraria, see https://s3 .amazonaws.com/fedsoc 
-cms-public/lilmuy/doclib/2011 0724 _SpeakersForm.pdf [http://perma.cc/XHC9-RUL6]. 
349 Federalist Society, supra note 346. 
350 Id. See TELES, supra note 152, at 147-51 (discussing the funding of the Federalist 
Society). 
'" Frequently Asked Questions, FEDERAilST SOC'Y, supra note 348 (discussing number 
of events); Support Funds for Presentation of Junior Scholarship, FEDERAllSTSOC'Y, https:/ I 
fedsoc.orlifopportunities/support-funds-fur-presentation-<Jf-junior-scholarship [http://permacc 
/7EUT-JQJH] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
352 See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf; Trickle-Dawn Antagonism, lNSIDEifiGHERED(May 10, 2017), 
https:/lwww.insidehigheredcomlnews/2017/05/10/gop-student-groups-mirror-tactics-national 
-organizations [http:/ /permacc/89RE-MGSF] (discussing the phenomenon of conservative na-
tional groups coordinating with student chapters to bring conservative speakers to campuses). 
353 YOUNGAMER!CA'SFOUNDATION,https://www.yaf.org [https://permacc/WSP4-8UXW]. 
'"' Stephanie Saul, The Conservative Force Behind Speeches Roiling College Campuses, 
N.Y. TiMES (May 20, 2017), https://nyti.rns/2rCnOw7. 
'" See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. 
356 See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. 
357 BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at39; CIIEMERINSKY &GilLMAN, supra note 5, at 19-20; 
PALFREY, supra note 5, at 17; WlllTI1NGTON, supra note 5, at 28-50. 
'" See infra notes 3 59-62 and accompanying text. 
359 JDR.GEN HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND 1HE 
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an ideal speech situation "makes possible unforced universal agreement."'" Truth, 
then, is an intersubjective phenomenon arising from a consensus among a group of 
speakers in such an ideal situation; the only force that matters is the rational force 
of the best argument. 361 In short, Habermas' s ideal speech situation is what we wish 
the marketplace of ideas to be. 362 
But the marketplace ofideas is not an ideal speech situation. In reality, the market-
place of ideas is never free of distortions."' It is constantly skewed by prejudices, 
coercion, and especially economic power, as illustrated in many of the no-platfurming 
disputes, including the Lewis and Clark imbroglio. 364 When one group of students, 
such as a student chapter of the Federalist Society, can access extensive funding to 
invite controversial speakers, such as Sommers, any ostensible societal search for 
truth is torpedoed before it even leaves the dock. As soon as the speaker arrives on 
campus, the starting point for discussion is tilted. The protesters in such scenarios 
might appear to interfere with the marketplace of ideas, but such a conclusion dis-
regards what preceded the protests. The provision of funding and the invitation already 
undermined the search for truth. 365 The fact that conservative student organizations 
sometimes purposefully provoke no-platforming disputes only underscores the 
failure of the marketplace of ideas. 366 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIE1Y 1-3 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979). In his later work, Habennas 
spoke of an "ideal communication community." JVRGEN IlABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND 
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 322 (William 
Rehg trans., 1996). 
360 JVRGEN HABERMAS, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in JOSEF BLEICHER, 
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 181, 206 (1980). 
361 !d. 
362 For more extensive discussions ofHabennas's communication theory, see THOMAS 
MCCAR1HY, IDEALS AND ILLUSIONS: ON RECONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION IN CON-
TEMPORARYCRmCAL THEORY (1991 ); Stephen M Feldman, The Problem q{Critique: Triangu-
lating Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer WithinMetamodemism, 4 CONTEMP. PoL. THEORY 
296 (2005) (discussing Habennas in conjWiction with Gadamer and Derrida). 
363 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSnTUTIONAL LAW 786 (2d ed. 1988); Stanley 
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. I. 
364 See PALFREY, supra note 5, at 67 (recognizing that, in the marketplace of ideas, some 
people have more power than others). 
365 
"What =erges in the market might better be viewed as a testimonial to power than as 
a reflection of truth." STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INWSTICE, AND TilE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA 6 (1999). 
366 Gross disparities of wealth and an over-emphasis on the economic marketplace can 
threaten democracy and democratic rights. See THOMAS l'IKET1Y, CAPITAL IN TilE TwEN1Y-
FlRsTCENTuRY(ArthurGoldhammertrans.,2014);seealsoFEIDMAN,FAII1NGCONSnTUTION, 
S!pl"a note 29, at 159-250 (arguing that gross inequality, among other factors, threatens Ameri-
can democratic government); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S TilE RrGFIT THING TO DO 
266 (2009) (arguing that gross inequality of wealth 'imdennines the solidarity that democratic 
citizenship requires"); Kate Klonick, The Nr<W Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARv. L.REv. 1598 (2018)(argningthat individual equality 
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The inherent distortions, the operations of economic and other forms of power, 
in these campus disputes remind us that a university (or the government) cannot 
maintain neutrality. When the search for truth is distorted before the conversation 
gets off the ground, then neutrality is impossible. The accumulation and protection 
of wealth, a central distorting factor in the marketplace of ideas, cannot occur without 
government sanction. By facilitating the operation of the economic marketplace and 
the ensuing disparities of wealth, the government has already placed its thumb on 
one side of the scales in any dialogic search for truth.367 In the no-platforming 
disputes, the university (or college) that grants a platform contravenes neutrality at 
the outset. To be sure, denial of a platform would also contravene neutrality. But 
that fact only underscores a key point, neutrality is, quite simply, not an option. 
Progressives and conservatives alike might not want university administrators 
to decide who is invited to speak on campus. Such administrative decision making, 
it is argued, resonates too closely with censorship. 368 Indeed, many university adminis-
trators undoubtedly would prefer not to make such decisions.'69 Ultimately, though, 
some individual or institotion decides. And right now, conservative stodent groups 
and conservative national organizations with deep pockets often decide, in effect, 
whether to grant platforms for potential campus speakers. This crucial point circles 
back around to the substantive component of pluralist democracy: the need to guarantee 
full and equal participation for all. 370 When some individuals and groups--especially 
historically marginalized groups--are excluded from participating in decision-making, 
then the outcome of the decision process is likely to manifest and reinforce exclu-
sion and marginalization-whether in Congress or on a university campus.'71 
In fact, conservative organizations currently seek to restrict and shape expression 
on campuses in multiple ways.'72 Numerous conservative Christian colleges, including 
Jerry Falwell's Liberty University, have denied platforms to speakers deemed un-
acceptable, including other Christians who question the politics of pro-Trump 
and freedom now depend on corporation decisions); K. Sabeel Rahman, Reconstructing the 
AdministrativeStateinAnEraofEconomicandDemocraticCrisis, 131 HARv.L.REv.1671 
(2018) (reviewing JOND. MICHAELS, CONS1ITUTIONALCOUP: PRIVATIZATION'S 'THREAT TO 
1IIEAMERICANREPUBUC(2017)) (arguing that privatization threatens democratic controls). 
367 Dahl argued that property and wealth endanger democracy if the wealthy can convert 
economic power into political power. DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 
68--69. Likewise, Sandel argued that economic inequality Widermines political community. 
SANDEL, supra note 15, at 330-32. 
368 CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 19--20, 72-73. 
369 See id. at 149 (the authors, both campus administrators, worry about the "risk [of] 
creating a campus orthodoxy of opinion''). 
37° FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 396. 
371 If university administrators do not want to decide about campus platforms, then they 
should at least allow students to vote for potential speakers in fully fair elections--before the 
speakers are invited. 
372 See supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text. 
986 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF R.!GHfS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:949 
evangelicals. 373 Meanwhile, organizations such as the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) and the Goldwater Institute have proposed model legislation that 
would regulate campus speech while claiming to upholdFirstAmendment freedoms. 374 
These organizations are not politically neutral. For example, ALEC is renowned for 
drafting model legislation that generally limits government, promotes an unregulated 
economic marketplace, and otherwise advances conservative causes. 375 ALEC encour-
ages lawmakers to enact its various model Acts at the state level. 376 Its membership 
consists of nearly 2,000 state legislators, almost all of whom are Republicans, as well 
as corporations and corporate officers. 377 Most of ALEC's funding comes from corpora-
tions, including Pfizer, BankofAmerica,BestBuy, Walmart, AT&T, and Verizon.378 
Corporate members can effectively veto any proposed model legislation. 379 
The Goldwater Institute claims to be a libertarian organization. 380 Its so-called 
Campus Free Speech Act is instructive. 381 It expressly prohibits the types of "pro-
tests and demonstrations" that have disrupted no-platformed controversial conserva-
tive speakers like Sommers. 382 It also mandates that a university "shall strive to re-
main neutral, as an institution, on the public policy controversies of the day," yet the 
Act does not clarify what university actions might be construed to be non-neutral. 383 
If the University president speaks against funding cuts for the University, is that pro-
hibited speech on a policy controversy? And when might faculty speech be deemed 
"' Laurie Goodstein, 'This Is Not of God': When Anti-Trump Evangelicals Confront Their 
Brethren, N.Y. TIMEs (May 23, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GI8eXI; The Invisible Free Speech 
Crisis, NEW REPuBliC (Apr. I 0, 20 18), https://newrepublic.com/article/14 7908/invisible-free 
-speech-crisis [http://perrna.cc/4AHM-WBB9]. 
374 Stanley Kurtz eta!., Campus Free Speech: A Legislative Proposal, GOIDWATERINST. 
(Jan. 30, 20 17), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/cms _page_ media/201 7/2 
/2/X _ Campus%20Free%20Speech%20Paper.pdf [http://perrna.cc/5D3R-T9EA ]; Forming 
Open and Robust University Minds (Forum) Act, AM. LEGIS. Exrn. COUNCIL (June 23, 
2017), https:/ /www.alec.org/model-policy/fonning-open-and-robust-university-minds-forum 
-act [http://perma.ccND7N-2TDE]. 
375 Mike Mcintire, Conservative Nonprofit Acts As A Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y. 
TIMEs (Apr. 21, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2jEpXXx. 
376 Molly Jackman, ALEC's Influence Over Lawmaking In State Legislatures, BROOKINGS 
(Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/alecs-influence-over-lawmaking-in-state 
-legislatures [https://perma.cc/6T4W-FL97]. 
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379 Information on ALEC is drawn from the following sources: Mcintire, supra note 3 75; 
John Nichols, ALEC Exposed, THE NATION (July 12, 2011), https://www.thenation.com/article 
/alec-exposed [http://perma.cc/DVE5-TZYN] (last visited Apr. II, 20 19); ALEC EXPOSED, 
https:/ lwww.alecexposed.org/wiki/ALEC _Exposed [http://perrna.cc/K4ZG-WVNZ] (last vis-
ited Apr. 11, 2019). 
380 GOIDWATERINST., https://goldwaterinstitute.org/about [http://perma.cc/QAS4-DRPG] 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
381 Kurtz eta!., supra note 374, at 19-22. 
382 Id. at 20. 
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institutional? If I send an email concerning a political controversy-for instance, let's 
say I interpret the Second Amendment as allowing gun regulation-would my email 
signature, which includes my faculty title, transform my writing into prohibited in-
stitutionalspeech?TheActevenmandatesanominousBig-Brother-like"Committee 
on Free Expression," which shall report, criticize, and recommend university actions 
to comply with the legislative requirements.384 Significantly, several Republican-
controlled states have discussed and enacted legislation based on this model Act. 385 
CONCLUSION 
The growing pluralism of American society in the early twentieth century led 
eventually to the emergence of pluralist democracy and the transformation of free 
expression into a constitutional lodestar. Ironically, then, in the no-platforming dis-
putes, the critics of the protesters base their arguments on the lodestar status of free 
expression while resisting the democratic implications of a pluralist community.386 
While the challenges of a pluralist society engendered the strengthening of First 
Amendment freedoms in the twentieth century, those same challenges necessitate 
limits on free expression when necessary to preserve democracy. Expression cannot 
be free when it undermines the democratic status of marginalized groups in our 
polity. Certain issues must be off the table, beyond democratic debate, because debate 
of such issues would contravene the conditions necessary for robust pluralist dem-
ocracy. All individuals, including members of historically marginalized groups, 
must be treated as full and equal citizens in good standing. 
Nevertheless, this Article should not be interpreted as an argument against free 
expression. First Amendment freedoms are central to our pluralist democracy. But 
free expression has never been an absolute. As the Court has recognized over the 
years, the government can justifiably punish or otherwise restrict expression in numer-
ous circumstances. 387 Regardless of whether the Court can be persuaded to deem 
speech uttered by right-wing provocateurs as categorically low-value expression 
outside First Amendment protection, the Court has allowed the government to restrict 
offensive expression in a variety of situations. 388 At a minimum, the no-platforming 
disputes demand similar judicial treatment. 389 
384 Id. at 21. 
385 See John Hardin, You Can't Legislate Free Inquiry on Campus, N.Y. TiMEs (May 21, 
2018), https://nyti.ms/2GDW69d. 
386 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1922-32 (discussing four ironies of the 
campus free speech disputes). 
387 See Chaplinskyv.New Hampshire, 315U.S. 568, 571-72(1942) (speciJYingthe existence 
oflow-value categories of expression outside First Amendment protection). 
388 See, e.g.,FCCv.PacificaFound.,438U.S. 726,748-51 (1978)(upholdingponishmeut 
of offensive language because of the potential presence of juvenile and captive audiences); 
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-Q3 (1976) (upholding zoning laws re-
stricting adult movie theaters because ofthe secondary effects of the expression). 
389 The Court has not held that hate speech is a low-value category, but the Court has 
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To be clear, hecklers are not necessarily entitled to shout down a speaker in a 
hostile audience situation. Frequently, in such situations, police should protect the 
speaker and control the crowd.'" But in the no-platforming disputes, a hostile au-
dience situation can be easily avoided. Universities and colleges should restrict the 
granting of platforms to speakers likely to threaten the full and equal standing of 
marginalized groups on the campuses. If a platform is denied in the first place, then 
a hostile audience situation will not arise. A student organization with deep pockets 
should not be free tu invite speakers likely to challenge the full and equal status of 
some members of the campus community.'" 
A university or college, in such a situation, would not deny a platform to a 
conservative speaker because she is conservative per se. Conservative speakers must 
be allowed to speak and challenge progressive positions. But no speakers, conservative 
or progressive, can be allowed to undermine the substantive conditions necessary 
for democracy. No speakers can be allowed to undermine the democratic status of 
members of the political community. 
This Article, fmally, does not advocate for thought control.392 While many indi-
viduals (including myself) would prefer that dislike and hatred of outsiders disappear, 
such attitudes are likely to persist far into the future. But for exactly that reason-
because America has long sustained an inegalitarian, ascriptive tradition targeting 
societal outsiders--campuses should act to prevent the public expression ofhatreds 
that undermine the existence of a truly democratic community. 393 The United States 
might harbor an inner Mr. Hyde, but we do not need to sit back and watch while 
letting him control the nation. 
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